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PARADISE LOST: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE
EROSION OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
JONATHAN TuRLEY*
INTRODUCTION
In Paradise Lost, Milton once described a "Serbonian Bog ...
[w]here Armies whole have sunk."' This illusion could have easily
been taken from the immediate aftermath of the Clinton crisis. On a
myriad of different fronts, the Clinton defense teams advanced sweep-
ing executive privilege arguments, only to be defeated in a series of
judicial opinions. This "Serbonian Bog" ultimately proved to be the
greatest factor in undoing efforts to combat inquiries into the Presi-
dent's conduct in the Lewinsky affair and the collateral scandals.2
More importantly, it proved to be the undoing of years of effort to
protect executive privilege from risky assertions or judicial tests.' In
the course of the Clinton litigation, courts imposed a series of new
* J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law, George Washington
University Law School. B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., Northwestern University.
1. JOHN MILTON & IsAAc ASIMoV, ASIMoV'S ANNOTATED Paradise Lost 88 (1974).
2. I obviously come to this subject with established views. I have been critical of the
Clinton administration's use of executive privilege arguments and its underlying theories
supporting these assertions in both the impeachment context and other contexts. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Turley, Checking the Executive Pulse: Mr. President, Where Is Thy Blush?; Impeachment:
For Censure to Work, Clinton Would Need to Have the Capacity to Feel Shame, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19,
1998, at B9; Jonathan Turley, Clinton Maneuvers Threaten His Office, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 23,
1998, at A19 [hereinafter Clinton Maneuvers]; Jonathan Turley, Guarding the King, Not His
Secrets, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 2, 1998, at 27 [hereinafter Guarding the King]; Jonathan Turley,
Nothing Bars Questioning the President's Bad Ideas; Executive Privilege: The Right to Refuse to Di-
vulge How FALN Clemency Decision Was Made Is Not Absolute, or Unwarranted Here, LA. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1999, at B7 [hereinafter Nothing Bars Questioning]; Jonathan Turley, Rule of Law:
Praetorian Privilege, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1998, at A23 [hereinafter Praetorian Privilege];
Jonathan Turley, The President and the Damage Done; Legal Costs of Clinton's Defense Outweigh
Financial Costs, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 20, 1998, at 23.
3. It has been suggested by former White House Counsel Abner Mikva that the ad-
ministration had no alternative but to litigate these privileges. See Jim Oliphant, Losing
Privilege; A Scandal-Scarred Legacy for Future Presidents: White House Counsel Without a Shield
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 6, 2000, at 20 (reporting Mikva's statements that because prior attorney-
client rulings did not allow the presidency to function as it should, the Clinton administra-
tion was forced to litigate). Such a statement is manifestly at odds with the more cautious
approach of prior administrations. See infra notes 15, 135-152 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the historical use of executive privilege). The White House is never compelled to
litigate executive privilege on questionable grounds. An administration could waive privi-
lege as to some of the information and still preserve objection for future cases. Unlike
court edicts, such waivers do not bind future administrations. Ultimately, Mikva's view
proved highly imprudent in an acutely sensitive and protected area.
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and restrictive decisions that ranged from a unanimous ruling of the
Supreme Court that the president is susceptible to civil suit during his
term, 4 to the rejection of the "protective function privilege" for Secret
Service agents, 5 to the loss of privilege protections for White House
staff in certain circumstances. 6 This Article explores the intriguing
question of what can be done in the area of executive privilege in the
aftermath of Clinton's failed assertions, or rather, what remains for
the next occupant of the Oval Office. Obviously, the rulings against
the Clinton administration will stand until challenged. Moreover,
there is little likelihood that such challenges would succeed in the
near future, and there is seemingly little incentive for future adminis-
trations to challenge the rulings on the controversial grounds chosen
by the Clinton administration. Therefore, it may be more useful to
discuss how future administrations can avoid such privilege conflicts
by addressing the underlying causes and mistakes that led to these
unsuccessful claims and the ultimate narrowing of the power of execu-
tive privilege.
Executive privilege and attorney-client privilege became the main
battlegrounds in the struggle between President Clinton and a variety
of legal adversaries, ranging from congressional committees to the In-
dependent Counsel. It is somewhat ironic that the most enduring leg-
acy of the Clinton administration may prove to be its effect on the law
of executive privilege. After all, the First Couple sharpened their po-
litical teeth during the 1960s and 1970s opposing the "imperial presi-
dency" of President Nixon. 7 Yet it would be President Clinton who
4. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692 (1997) (finding that the President's argument
that "'in all but the most exceptional cases,' . . . the Constitution affords the President
temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred
before he took office-can not be sustained on the basis of precedent").
5. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding
that the Secret Service "failed to carry its heavy burden ... of establishing the need for the
protective function privilege" that would have protected Secret Service agents from having
to testify regarding information obtained while performing their protective function in
physical proximity to the president).
6. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C.) (prohibiting Deputy
White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey from using attorney-client privilege to withhold infor-
mation about possible criminal misconduct by the President), affd in part, revd in part sub
nom In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam); see also In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 925-26 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that the First Lady
could not rely on attorney-client privilege in meetings in which both private and govern-
ment counsel participated).
7. Bill Clinton protested the Vietnam War as a student in Britain, while Hillary Clin-
ton worked as a staff attorney on the House committee that voted to impeach Nixon.
Thomas B. Rosenstiel, Richard Nixon: 1913-1994; Clinton Plays an Ironic Role for Nixon Fu-
neral; Presidency: Two Decades Ago, He Protested the War While Hillay Rodham Aided Watergate
Probe. Now the White House Is Planning Rites for a Respected Adviser, L.A. TiMEs, Apr. 25, 1994,
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would help rewrite this area of constitutional law by advancing and
losing a series of privilege assertions.8
While assertions of executive privilege in some form can be
traced back to George Washington,9 the modern doctrine of execu-
tive privilege was the creation of the Supreme Court's 1974 decision
in United States v. Nixon,"° where the Court compelled President Rich-
ard Nixon to surrender audio tapes from the White House that were
relevant to the Watergate scandal.11 Prior to 1974, however, presi-
dents had struggled over the disclosure of information with both the
at A16; see also Turley, Clinton Maneuvers, supra note 2, at A19 (noting the irony of Bill
Clinton's criticism of the Watergate scandal in light of his own "sweeping" assertions of
executive privilege).
8. In addition to invoking privileges in proceedings involving allegations of miscon-
duct by the President, the First Lady, or high-ranking officials, the Clinton administration
aggressively asserted executive authority or discretion in a host of other areas. For exam-
ple, the administration objected to the application of the Privacy Act to the White House.
See, e.g.,Jonathan Groner, A Matter of Privilege: The Latest Battle, LEGAL TIMES, May 22, 2000,
at 7 (reporting Deputy Assistant Attorney General William Schultz's argument that the
Privacy Act does not apply to the White House); John Mintz, Judge: White House Broke Law;
Release of Willey Letters Seen as Privacy Act Violation, WAsH. POST, Mar. 30, 2000, at Al (report-
ing the assertion by White House Counsel Beth Nolan "that releasing the Willey notes was
'fully consistent with the law and the Justice Department's advice' that White House files
are not covered by the Privacy Act"). See generally United States House of Representatives,
Comm. on Gov't Reform, Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Re-
sources (Sept. 8, 2000) (Federal Document Clearing House) (prepared statement and
testimony of Jonathan Turley, J.B. & Maurice Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law,
George Washington University Law School) (discussing "the presidency and the Privacy
Act"). The assertion that the Privacy Act does not apply to the president was made in court
in defense of the President's release of letters to discredit Kathleen Willey, who accused
the President of molesting her in the Oval Office when she came to discuss a paid position
with the White House. See Mintz, supra, at Al.
The Clinton administration has also adopted extreme interpretations of privilege
under the Military and State Secrets Privilege. See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE Std. 509-1 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.
2000) ("The government has a privilege to refuse to give evidence and to prevent any
person from giving evidence upon a showing of reasonable likelihood of danger that the
evidence will disclose a secret of state or official information . . . ."). The "Area 51 litiga-
tion" provides an example. In the Area 51 litigation, current and former workers of a
facility located ninety miles northwest of Las Vegas alleged that they may have been ex-
posed to extremely harmful levels of hazardous wastes. Jonathan Turley, Through a Looking
Glass Darkly: National Security and Statutory Intepretation, 53 SMU L. REv. 205, 210-13 (2000).
In response to discovery requests, the Air Force asserted the "state secrets privilege." Id. at
215. On September 29, 1995, President Clinton issued a presidential determination that
exempted from public disclosure any information relating to Area 51 that had been classi-
fied by the Air Force. Id. at 217.
9. See infra notes 136-139 and accompanying text (discussing President Washington's
use of executive privilege).
10. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
11. Id. at 713-14.
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judicial and legislative branches.' 2 Yet the privilege assertions made
by past presidents are strikingly different from the Clinton assertions
in two important respects. First, while most prior administrations stu-
diously avoided court tests of privilege claims, the Clinton administra-
tion used privilege arguments comparably freely in litigation.13 The
result of this strategy may prove to be markedly negative for future
administrations. Second, the Clinton administration used privilege ar-
guments in controversies that were sharply removed from areas of offi-
cial conduct or matters of state.14 Where prior administrations had
almost exclusively raised privilege arguments with regard to official
duties,'" the Clinton administration aggressively pursued the applica-
tion of privileges in matters relating to the President's private con-
duct. This further accelerated the loss of privilege protections, as
even conservative judges who would normally gravitate in favor of
presidential powers found the Clinton administration's claims lacking
in legal substance and constitutional support.16
12. See MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMO-
cRATIC AccouN- ABILn 37-48 (1994) (discussing the use of executive privilege until the
Nixon administration).
13. The Clinton administration invoked privilege repeatedly in congressional and judi-
cial proceedings involving allegations of misconduct by either the President, the First Lady,
or high-ranking officials. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
14. See supra note 8 (providing examples from the wide array of privilege claims as-
serted by this President).
15. For example, in the nineteenth century, James Madison withheld information re-
garding French trade restrictions against the United States. RoZELL, supra note 12, at 38.
PresidentJames Monroe "withheld information from Congress regarding the U.S. takeover
of the Florida territory." Id. President Andrew Jackson refused to divulge information
concerning U.S. negotiations with the Republic of Buenos Aires. Id In the 20th century,
President William McKinley withheld from the Senate information on a War Department
investigation of expenditures of Cuban funds. Id. at 42. Despite a disclosure request from
the Senate, President Calvin Coolidge kept confidential details on companies being investi-
gated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Id. at 42-43. The Eisenhower administration
invoked the privilege over forty times, often in relation to the army-McCarthy hearings. Id.
at 44-45.
16. It is notable that the most damaging rulings came out of the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. and Eighth Circuits-home to some of the country's most conservative jurists. See,
e.g., In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (refusing to
recognize a protective function privilege for Secret Service agents subpoenaed to testify
before a grand jury); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (ordering the in
camera review of certain withheld documents asserted as privileged by the White House in
the investigation of former Secretary of Agriculture Michael Espy); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 925-26 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing and remanding an
order of the district court that denied the Office of the Independent Counsel's motion to
compel the production of documents subpoenaed by a federal grand jury investigating the
alleged Whitewater scandal). Judges who are known to be highly deferential to presidential
power were given a series of executive privilege assertions that were simply beyond the pale
and impossible to justify. It is an indication of the extreme interpretations of the Clinton
administration that these and other negative opinions were written by judges like District
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It will fall on the next president to reestablish clear guidelines for
privilege assertions and to restore to the Office of the President a de-
gree of luster after years of ignoble scandal. 7 Yet it is important not
to overstate the practical effect of Clinton's privilege assertions on fu-
ture administrations. The Clinton administration unsuccessfully ar-
gued extreme assertions of privilege that hopefully few presidents will
find necessary to make. Clinton attempted to exercise privilege to re-
fuse evidence requested by another governmental branch in a crimi-
nal investigation 8 and to stymie a civil lawsuit stemming from his
conduct as a private citizen before taking office.' 9 Few presidents
have ever faced such scandals, and none but Nixon felt the need to
invoke executive privilege in such a context. On some level, these
rulings simply confirmed the view of some academicians that over the
years executive privilege has been artificially inflated.2" There will
clearly be practical changes in how White House meetings occur and
in the willingness of some staffers to take detailed notes on some sub-
jects.21 The most significant impact on future administrations, how-
Judge Norma Holloway Johnson and appellate judges Douglas Ginsburg, Raymond Ran-
dolph, and Stephen Williams-jurists who would normally be expected to favor such argu-
ments. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1074 (per curiam opinion of Judges
Ginsburg, Randolph, and Williams affirmingJudge Norma HollowayJohnson's rejection of
the protective function privilege).
17. Shortly before this Article went to print, George W. Bush was inaugurated as the
43rd President of the United States. Arguments in this Article, however, were not written
with the expectation of either a Gore or Bush administration.
18. See In re Sealed Case, 116 F.3d 550, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (denying the White
House's attempt to exercise privilege to withhold from criminal investigators documents
concerning the White House's initial investigation of former Secretary of Agriculture
Michael Espy).
19. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 684 (1997) (rejecting Clinton's argument that
the president is immune to civil damages liability arising out of actions occurring before
his term began). In some cases, the use of privilege arguments appeared to serve tactical
interests in litigation rather than true constitutional purposes. See MarkJ. Rozell, Executive
Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon's Shadow, 83 MINN. L. Rv. 1069, 1125 (1999)
(stating that the "White House [made] efforts to obstruct and delay for the sake of some
perceived political advantage [and such efforts] cynically undermined both the privilege
and the principle"); Turley, Clinton Maneuvers, supra note 2, at A19 (discussing the Clinton
administration's use of litigation where "[t ] he unstated policy has been to defuse or settle
any conflicts, to avoid restricting future administrations with judicial decisions").
20. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, ExEcuTvE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTrUnoNAL MYrH 1 (1974)
(prophesying that "'[e]xecutive privilege'-the President's claim of constitutional author-
ity to withhold information from Congress-is a myth" (footnote omitted)); Louis Fisher,
Invoking Executive Privilege: Navigating Ticklish Political Waters, 8 WM. & MAR' BILL OF RTs. J.
583, 583 (2000) (concluding that the "scope of presidential authority" in the realm of
executive privilege "has been greatly exaggerated").
21. One of the most significant losses was the determination that White House legal
aides do not share the same privileges as private counsel. See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263,
1266 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (finding that attorneys in the Office of the President
209
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ever, is the loss of a basis for negotiation and of the ability to
essentially bluff in struggles over the production of documents. What
was once a matter of debate is now a certainty-to the disadvantage of
future administrations. 22
The Clinton administration's assertions of privilege were not only
uncompelling; they also threatened core values of good government.
Underlying these cases are fundamental questions about the appropri-
ateness of governmental employees working in areas of the personal
interest of the First Couple or resisting efforts to investigate criminal
conduct. Particularly in the first five years of the administration, there
was little discernible effort to ensure that White House personnel
were serving the interests of the presidency and not the interests of
the President as an individual. 2' This lack of division created the very
conditions that led to the overbroad assertions and the many errors of
judgment committed by White House personnel. It is for this reason
that the next president would be well-served to implement opera-
tional changes that would protect executive privilege by reducing the
number of circumstances in which it would be needed.24
Discussions of executive privilege often tend to be somewhat de-
tached from the underlying causes or circumstances for its assertion.
To understand the future significance of executive privilege, one must
look not to the internal conflicts within the first three Articles of the
Constitution, but to the internal workings of the White House and its
staff. Specifically, the next administration should look closely at the
role of the Secret Service, the White House counsel, the first lady,
are "government employees doing government business, and neither legal authority nor
policy nor experience suggests that a federal government entity can maintain the ordinary
common law attorney-client privilege to withhold information relating to a federal criminal
offense"). These aides, however, still remain protected by executive privilege under a vari-
ety of prior decisions. See id. at 1278 (holding that although a government employee could
not claim traditional attorney-client privilege "he continues to be covered by the executive
privilege to the same extent as the President's other advisers"). See generally In re Sealed
Case, 116 F.3d 550, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (citing prior cases where executive
officials have claimed numerous privileges "to resist disclosure of information the confi-
dentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities
of the executive branch of our government").
22. In the short term, for example, this loss of bargaining position will be felt in the
daily struggle with congressional oversight committees.
23. For example, at a grand jury proceeding, Bruce R. Lindsey, Deputy White House
Counsel and Assistant to the President, declined to answer questions relating to the Presi-
dent's possible misconduct in the Monica Lewinsky matter, which was investigated as part
of Starr's Whitewater inquiry. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1267.
24. Some of the areas in need of reform obviously extend beyond simple problems
with executive privilege and touch on a host of other issues ranging from attorney-client
privilege to nepotism. These will likely remain high-risk areas after the Clinton administra-
tion and are naturally the subject of this Article.
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and, ultimately, the president himself in the area of executive privi-
lege. For better or worse, the next president has the opportunity to
make some significant and highly beneficial changes in the wake of
the Clinton crisis. A new legacy can be established that reduces past
dependence on executive privilege and defines the underlying legal
relationships and communications within the Executive Office of the
President. Significant questions of public policy lurk beneath the sur-
face of these issues. While these ethical and constitutional problems
were often presented in raw partisan terms during the Clinton crisis,
their origins pre-date the Clinton administration and only became
magnified during the crisis. Both the legislative and executive
branches can now return to these questions outside of the partisan
context of an impeachment to seek reasonable and positive changes.
This Article offers only a brief treatment of four issues relevant to the
future of executive privilege: the role of the Secret Service, the White
House counsel, the first lady, and the chief executive. There are obvi-
ously a host of insular issues that can and should be addressed by the
incoming administration. However, this Article primarily seeks to
show that, like more conventional subjects for transition teams, this is
an area that warrants comprehensive and deliberate reform. Before
the next president sets out a new course in federal policies, he should
direct his transition efforts, in part, to repairing damage to the presi-
dency itself. It may prove the most defining moment for the next
president and the most lasting reform for his administration.
I. LIVING WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS: FOUR AREAS OF REFORM
FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENT
A. The Role of the Secret Service
The most immediate area to address in the new administration
may be the role of the Secret Service. During the Clinton crisis, the
administration attempted to establish a new privilege that would have
barred a federal grand jury from acquiring evidence from Secret Ser-
vice personnel.2 5 Legislation creating such a protective function privi-
25. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam). See gener-
ally Peter Baker, Clinton's Trust in Agents Evolves; Despite Testimony, Secret Service Has Not Been
Pushed Away, WAsH. POST, July 19, 1998, at A6 (discussing the possible ramifications of
compelling Secret Service agents to testify against a president); Peter Baker, Starr Subpoenas
Top Clinton Agent; 6 Other Secret Service Officers Summoned, WASH. POST, July 15, 1998, at Al
(discussing the move by Starr to subpoena Secret Service agents and the order compelling
those agents to testify).
For the purpose of full disclosure, I served as counsel to four United States Attorneys
General who filed briefs in opposition to the protective function privilege and appeared
before the Court of Appeals in that case. The four attorneys general were William Barr,
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lege has been drafted and may be reintroduced after the November
election. 26 The next president would serve a great public interest by
renouncing efforts to create a privilege that would bar testimony of
Secret Service agents in criminal cases.
While personal privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege,
may be claimed by a president as an individual, assertions of executive
privilege have been confined to the realm of executive functions and
duties based on Article II of the Constitution. 27 Privileges within the
executive branch are both narrow in scope and narrowly construed in
cases. 28  Both the testimonial and nontestimonial privileges serve a
Griffin Bell, Edwin Meese, and Dick Thornburgh. See Peter Baker, Assassination Risk Cited
in Ex-Agents" Brief to Block Queries, WASH. POST, June 16, 1998, at A9; Former AGs Offer Pointed
Advice, LEGAL TIMES, June 1, 1998, at 9. I also served as a legal analyst in media coverage in
this area. See, e.g., Meet the Press: Michael Leibig; Leon Panetta, Jeff Connaugh, Jonathan Turley
and Stuart Taylor Discuss Ken Starr's Investigation of President Clinton (NBC television broad-
cast, July 19, 1998) (discussing Ken Starr's subpoena of Secret Service agents and what
information he hoped to gain from their testimony); The Newshour withfim Lehrer: Starr vs.
the Secret Service (MacNeil/Lehrer television broadcast, July 15, 1998) (offering differing
viewpoints on the propriety of Kenneth Starr's issuance of seven subpoenas to Secret Ser-
vice agents and the court order mandating their testimony).
26. Secret Service Protective Privilege Act of 1999, S. 1360, 106th Cong. (1999). The
articulated purpose of this Act is "[t] o preserve the effectiveness of Secret Service protec-
tion by establishing a protective function privilege." Id. at 1. When this new privilege was
proposed by the Clinton administration in court, it was heavily criticized by some members
of Congress. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REc. S8466 (dally ed. July 17, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch) (criticizing the proposed privilege, but suggesting the possibility of a protec-
tive function privilege that would be more limited than the one asserted by President Clin-
ton); 144 CONG. REC. E1182 (daily ed. June 19, 1998) (statement of Rep. Tom DeLay)
(identifying myriad reasons why the administration's assertion of the "specious privilege"
was "deeply troubling," and arguing that the Attorney General should withdraw her appeal
of Judge Johnson's decision to compel Secret Service agents to testify against the
President).
27. See supra note 15 (giving an historical overview of past presidents' more traditional
use of executive privilege-confined to the realm of executive functions); cf Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (holding that "petitioner, as a former President of the
United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his
official acts"); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ("As to . . . areas of
Art[icle] II duties the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential
responsibilities.").
28. Courts have narrowly construed assertions of the military and state secrets privilege,
see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953) (finding a valid claim of privilege, but
warning that the privilege "is not to be lightly invoked," and that "[t] here must be a formal
claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the mat-
ter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine
whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege .... "), the delibera-
tive process privilege under the Freedom of Information Act, see Army Times Publ'g Co. v.
Dep't of the Air Force, 998 F.2d 1067, 1070, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (demonstrating the
narrow scope of executive privilege by recognizing that the privilege exists, but remanding
the case and instructing the Air Force to demonstrate that no segregable information ex-
isted within the documents held), and the presidential communications privilege, see In re
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common purpose in protecting the executive branch from distrac-
tions or unfounded litigation arising out of the performance of execu-
tive branch functions.2 9 Executive privileges, therefore, ultimately
coincide with official duties of the executive branch. As such, the Su-
preme Court has distinguished criminal investigations from inquiries
generally covered by the privileges.30 Because the president is re-
quired by oath to uphold the nation's criminal laws, any criminal act
falls outside of the duties of his office-and, by extension, outside of
the privileges created to advance those duties.3 1 As the Supreme
Court cautioned in United States v. Nixon, the need to protect presiden-
tial communications must yield to the public's great need for evidence
in criminal proceedings:
A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the
communications of his office is general in nature, whereas
the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence
in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair
adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administra-
tion of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal
prosecution may be totally frustrated....
... The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to
the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending
criminal trial. 2
The proposed protective function privilege represented a
generalized assertion of privilege made by federal employees to cover
information that is clearly outside the scope of both the deliberative
Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that the presiden-
tial communications privilege applied to all documents withheld by the White House, but
stating that privilege can be overcome by a specific showing of need, and that the Office of
Independent Counsel conveyed such a showing of need sufficient to obtain information in
some of the documents).
29. See generally supra note 15 (citing instances where executive privilege has been in-
voked by past presidents to protect the executive branch in its executive function).
30. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707. The Nixon Court explained:
To read the Art[icle] II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege
as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more
than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of non-military
and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of "a work-
able government" and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art[icle] III.
Id.
31. The Constitution mandates that the president must swear to the following oath: "'I
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the
United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitu-
tion of the United States.'" U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. The Constitution further pro-
vides that the president "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id. § 3.
32. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712-13.
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process and presidential communications. 3 At no time in our history
has a federal court adopted such a broad claim of privilege, let alone
applied such a privilege to relevant evidence in a criminal investiga-
tion. 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit was no exception when it rejected the Clinton
administration's effort to fashion this new privilege for use during the
crisis.
33. This places the proposed privilege in conflict with the traditional view that the law
does not protect "purely factual or investigatory reports," but rather "internal communica-
tions consisting of advice, recommendations, opinions, and other material reflecting delib-
erative or policy-making processes." 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 8, § 509.23[2]. The
proposed privilege would not distinguish between official and unofficial conduct or the
content of a communication. See Secret Service Protective Privilege Act of 1999, S. 1360,
106th Cong. (1999); id at 6 (providing only a single content-based exemption "with re-
spect to information that, at the time the information was acquired by Secret Service per-
sonnel, was sufficient to provide reasonable grounds to believe that a crime had been, was
being, or would be committed").
34. The former Secret Service agents that filed an amicus brief when In re Sealed Case
reached the D.C. Circuit stressed that Chief Judge Johnson committed reversible error by
not holding a full evidentiary hearing on the basis of the privilege. Brief of Amici Curiae at
18, In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (No. 98-3069). According to the
former agents, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 "virtually mandates" that a court hold such a
hearing and "its decision should [have been] reversed for this reason alone." Id. This
argument was meritless. No circuit court has imposed such a burdensome requirement
that, in the absence of a full evidentiary hearing, a court commits reversible error in deny-
ing the creation of a new privilege. Any profession or organization can assert a new privi-
lege in the course of a criminal proceeding, but it is hardly logical to suggest that courts
must, as a matter of law, give each claim a full evidentiary hearing. Moreover, it is an
extraordinary accomplishment to devise a congressional intent for such hearings from the
mere use of the word "experience" in Rule 501. FED. R. Evm. 501 ("[T]he privilege of a
witness... shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."). Chief
Judge Johnson considered the factual submissions of the White House and found them
insufficient to support a new, sweeping privilege. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Misc.
No. 98-148, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7734, at *10-*15 (D.D.C. May 22, 1998). The fact that
the court rejected these assertions is not proof that it gave too little consideration to the
representations, but rather that there was too little in the representations to support a new
privilege.
35. In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1079 (refusing to recognize the Secret Service's
claimed privilege and holding that such a privilege did not protect agents from being
compelled to testify); see also Susan Schmidt, Starr Wins Appeal in Privilege Dispute; Secret
Service Fears Dismissed by Court, WASH. POST, July 8, 1998, at Al (summarizing the court's
decision to compel the agents to testify and reporting that the court "dismiss[ed] as 'vague
fears' the agency's claim that such testimony could endanger the life of the president").
Not only is there an absence of any prior judicial recognition of this privilege, but the
proposed privilege also would conflict with the traditional view of the obligations of federal
employees in supplying information in criminal proceedings. As the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum,
112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir. 1997), "executive branch employees, including attorneys, are
under a statutory duty to report criminal wrongdoing by other employees to the Attorney
General." Id (citing 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994)). Courts have repeatedly stressed that law
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Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress spe-
cifically allowed for the recognition of certain privileges "governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."36
The federal courts, however, have traditionally disfavored new privi-
leges and have construed narrowly the scope of existing privileges.3 7
enforcement personnel have an obligation to the public to disclose any evidence of crime,
and the failure to do so can be grounds for removal or even prosecution in some circum-
stances. See, e.g., Watson v. Dep't of Justice, 64 F.3d 1524, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (explain-
ing that a law enforcement officer had "an overriding duty to report violations of law in a
timely fashion" and that an officer who fails to so report "risks punishment for untimely
disclosure"). This duty was codified by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994), which re-
quires "[g]overnment officers and employees" to "expeditiously" report any criminal con-
duct. A court cannot continue to apply a common law evidentiary privilege in the face of a
directly conflicting statute, let alone (as suggested here) create a privilege in the midst of
such a conflict. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) ("We have always
recognized that federal common law is 'subject to the paramount authority of Congress.'"
(quoting NewJersey v. NewYork, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931))); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 248 (1974) (discussing why a federal common law privilege of immunity was barred by
a countervailing federal statute). Such was the case in United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
465 U.S. 805 (1984), where the Supreme Court refused to recognize a new work-product
privilege that would conflict with a section of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Id& at
817-19. This section authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to summon and "examine
any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material" to a tax in-
quiry. 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (a) (1) (1994). It was not within the Court's power to create such
an overriding privilege. The Court explained that "[i]f the broad latitude granted to the
IRS by § 7602 is to be circumscribed, that is a choice for Congress, and not this Court, to
make." Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 817.
36. FED. R. EVID. 501.
37. See, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (refusing to create a new
privilege against the disclosure of a university's peer review materials and explaining that
"(w]e are especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where it appears that
Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has not provided the privi-
lege itself"); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707 (refusing to recognize the presidential communications
privilege as absolute and reasoning that such a construction of the privilege would place an
impediment "in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do
justice in criminal prosecutions").
This hesitancy to expand privilege is based on the oft-repeated principle that the pub-
lic is entitled to "every man's evidence" and that disclosure of such evidence is particularly
important to the functioning of the grand jury system. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
688 (1972) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932)); see also In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 806 (D.C. Cir.
1982) ("Nowhere is the public's claim to each person's evidence stronger than in the con-
text of a valid grand jury subpoena."). The type of arguments put forth by the Clinton
administration certainly showed why federal courts are wise to be skeptical and slow in the
development of new privileges. In the litigation over the protective function privilege,
former Secret Service agents warned the court that "the decision of the District Court in
refusing to recognize a Protective Function Privilege will lead inexorably to the successful
assassination of another American President in our lifetime." Brief of Amici Curiae at 1, In
re Sealed Case (No. 98-3069). Likewise, the court was told that any decision not giving the
Secret Service this new special status would "threaten[ ] the very security of our Nation."
Id. at 9. Finally, the former agents offered as an aside comment that "one wonders how
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There was no compelling need for the articulated protective
function privilege until the Clinton crisis.38 Notably, the need was
"compelling" only in the self-interest of the President and not in the
general interest of the public. President Clinton committed acts that
were sufficient to trigger impeachment, as well as sanctions by a fed-
eral court,39 a recommendation for disbarment,4" and a protracted
grand jury investigation for possible indictment.41 These are circum-
stances that have not been common among our presidents, and they
should not influence the creation of a sweeping new privilege. Also,
these are not circumstances sufficiently related "to the effective dis-
charge of a president's powers"4 2 to constitute a constitutional basis
for an assertion of privilege.
While the proposed privilege refers to the protective function of
the Secret Service,43 the actual physical protection of the president
and information relevant to protective functions are not at risk of dis-
closure. Existing common law privileges and statutory law protect ac-
tual security-related information.44
many centuries of Presidential assassination attempts the District Court would require
before recognizing the importance of the Protective Function Privilege." Id. at 18 n.23.
Such hyperbole has no place in federal court. These arguments only serve to reaffirm the
decision of the trial court that the representations of the Secret Service in this case were
untenable. See In re GrandJury Proceedings, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7734, at *15. Certainly
these arguments hardly encourage a court to recognize such unprecedented and unilateral
authority in this small governmental unit.
38. But see Declaration of Lewis C. Merletti, Director, United States Secret Service, In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7734. Merletti claimed that the need for
close proximity between a president and Secret Service agents is inherent in the organiza-
tion's historical duty to protect the president's safety. Id, 1 17. For this reason, Merletti
argued, the protective function privilege should have been recognized to ensure an "at-
mosphere of complete trust between a President and his protective detail." Id. 18.
39. SeeJones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1120 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (adjudging Presi-
dent Clinton to be in contempt of court and liable for the expenses caused by his failure to
obey the court's discovery orders). See generallyJonathan Turley, Rule of Law: What's Wrong
with Wright, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1999, at A23 (summarizing Judge Susan Webber Wright's
findings of several instances of willful misconduct by the President).
40. John F. Harris, Ark. Panel Supports Disbarring Clinton; Court Committee Calls Testimony
Serious Misconduct, WASH. POST, May 23, 2000, at Al ("The Arkansas Supreme Court's disci-
plinary committee recommended yesterday that President Clinton be disbarred for what it
described as 'serious misconduct' by the president when he gave misleading answers under
oath in the Paula Jones sexual harassment case.").
41. See generally Jonathan Turley, "From Pillar to Post": The Prosecution of American Presi-
dents, 37 Am. CRiM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001); R.G. Ratcliffe, Bush Says No Pardon Without
Indictment, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 9, 2001, at A3.
42. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711.
43. Secret Service Protective Privilege Act of 1999, S. 1360, 106th Cong. (1999).
44. Most security-related documents and information would be easily shielded from
disclosure under the military and state secrets privilege. See United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 11-12 (1953) (upholding the ability of the Air Force to withhold documents under
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The decision in Clinton v. Jones"5 demonstrates the ability of the
courts to encourage traditional or statutory means to protect any in-
formation that would undermine a president's security.4 6 Courts
often act in such a way in cases where classified or sensitive informa-
tion is sought.4 7 Where a compelling claim can be made for a protec-
tive order, courts will restrict the disclosure of information to protect
the president's security.48 More specifically, courts have often accom-
modated the security-related concerns of the Secret Service.49 While
the Secret Service has been asked for information disclosure, no fed-
eral court has ordered the release of sensitive security information in-
imical to the president's safety.
The proposed privilege, therefore, would not be used to withhold
security-related information sought in either criminal or civil litiga-
tion; such information is already covered by existing privileges and
law.5" Nor would the new privilege be used to withhold nonsecurity
information sought in any civil litigation related to official duties; such
the military and state secrets privilege). But see supra note 37 (indicating that the privilege
is narrowly construed). In addition to this privilege, classification laws impose heavy re-
strictions on and procedures for the use of such information. The Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA) protects classified information-determined to be such pursuant
to an executive order-in the interest of the national defense and the foreign relations of
the United States. 18 U.S.C. app. III (1994). Courts routinely exempt classified informa-
tion in criminal cases under the Classified Information Procedures Act. See, e.g., United
States v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 1359, 1365 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Noriega, 117 F.2d
1206, 1215-16 (1lth Cir. 1997). Likewise, in civil suits seeking information from the Secret
Service, sensitive or "law enforcement" information is clearly exempted from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1994) (exempt-
ing from FOIA "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes").
45. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
46. See iL at 708-09 (relying on general principles of litigation and statutory law to
rebut notions that the ruling might impede the performance of presidential duties).
47. See supra note 44 (discussing the protections afforded by FOIA and CIPA, and the
Supreme Court's treatment of sensitive or classified information). While statutory means
of protection are encouraged, often the interest of courts in protecting sensitive informa-
tion has led to conflicted and, at times, excessive rulings. See generally Turley, supra note 8
(highlighting the difficulty and inconsistencies of both courts and academicians in inter-
preting statutes related to national security by examining two conflicting opinions in factu-
ally similar cases).
48. See, e.g., Moorefield v. United States Secret Serv., 611 F.2d 1021, 1026 (5th Cir.
1980) (restricting the disclosure of information pursuant to a FOIA request by denying
plaintiff s request to obtain the file maintained on him by the United States Secret Ser-
vice); id. at 1022, 1026 (noting that the plaintiff bringing the FOIA request had been con-
victed twice for threatening the President's life).
49. See, e.g., Accuracy In Media, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., No. 97-2108, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5798, at *13 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1998) (denying a FOIA request for informa-
tion related to the death of the late Deputy White House Counsel Vincent W. Foster, Jr.,
based on the assertion of the Secret Service that disclosure could interfere with the conse-
quent investigation of Foster's death).
50. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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litigation is already barred by the common law.51 The only applied
purpose of a new protective function privilege would be to protect
nonsecurity information that is relevant to a criminal investigation. 2
However, as shown below, this purpose would not be achieved under a
protective function privilege.53
51. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (holding that the president "is
entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts").
52. The defense of the protective function privilege has often turned on maddening
generalities. For example, on the Newshour withfJim Lehrer, Professor Ronald K Noble in-
sisted that a clear line exists between reporting criminal and noncriminal conduct. See The
Newshour with Jim Lehrer: Presidential Investigation (MacNeil/Lehrer television broadcast,
Feb. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Newshour] ("In order for [Secret service agents] to be trusted
they've got to be able to maintain confidences of non-criminal conduct that they might
observe or overhear."). This point is rather illusory, however, since noncriminal conduct is
often material evidence of a crime. If an agent should be required to report a crime, it is
difficult to see how Professor Noble's principled distinction would prevent the same agent
from reporting conduct proving such a crime occurred. Thus, an agent would be able to
report that he saw the president murder a staffer, but not that he saw the president run-
ning from the scene that night or washing his hands after the alleged incident. It is a
meaningless distinction upon which to base a privilege and is one that is unlikely to offer
much assurance to a president concerned about revealing evidence of criminality. Cf In re
Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) ("[B]ecause the President
cannot know whether an agent will realize he is witnessing the commission of a felony...
the President will have to discount substantially the value of the protective function privi-
lege (and thus perhaps be tempted to distance himself from his protectors all the same).").
The agents in the Clinton crisis were asked for confirmation of events denied by the Presi-
dent under oath-evidence that would directly support a criminal charge of perjury. See
Peter Baker, Clinton Perjury Allegations, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1998, at A14 (reporting that
"six Secret Service officers testified they saw Clinton and Lewinsky alone," which was in
apparent contrast to Clinton's prior statement that he could not recall being alone with
Lewinsky). Professor Noble, however, believes that a distinction could be drawn that only
requires testimony when an agent witnesses "the president engaged in patently or obvious
criminal conduct." Newshour, supra. Such a subjective distinction would be unique in our
system and impossible to define. Given the ad hoc nature of such suggestions, it is not
surprising that the court found little foundation for a protective function privilege and
concluded that such a privilege would materially undermine the role of the Secret Service
as a law enforcement agency. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1078 (finding that "strong
congressional policy that executive branch employees must report information 'relating to
violations of [the federal criminal code]' . . . weighs against judicial recognition of the
privilege proposed here").
53. Ironically, the proposed privilege cannot possibly achieve its objective of assured
confidentiality without extending this special status to all security and nonsecurity person-
nel who could be called as witnesses. By shielding only a small percentage of the federal
employees who witness presidential communications and conduct, the proposed privilege
would leave the same information susceptible to disclosure by other federal employees. See
Secret Service Protective Privilege Act of 1999, S. 1360, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing a
new privilege that would only apply to Secret Service personnel). Specifically, the pro-
posed privilege would not prevent the identical communications from being revealed by
legal staff, political staff, administrative staff, household staff, retired security staff, or state
or local security officers. A president, therefore, would not achieve any measurable degree
of added confidentiality from this privilege because most individuals who participate in (or
witness) communications or conduct would not be covered by this new privilege.
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In the Oval Office, a pantry is staffed by employees who can be
(and have been) called as witnesses in criminal investigations.54 As
public employees, these individuals must give relevant information to
criminal investigators. 5 Likewise, White House lawyers, secretaries,
and administrative staff can be (and have been) called to testify in
criminal investigations. 56 These "unprivileged" employees would hear
the same communications presumably overheard by Secret Service
agents.
Even security staff would not be completely shielded from making
disclosures under a protective function privilege. The president is
often guarded by a host of state and federal law enforcement person-
nel beyond the relatively small contingent of Secret Service agents.57
Moreover, Secret Service personnel who retire or leave federal em-
ployment would not clearly fall under the privilege, despite the fact
that the most noted public disclosures of information have been
traced to retired or former security personnel.58 As a result, this new
Throughout a given day, the president is surrounded by personnel performing security,
administrative, and catering functions. Ironically, the Secret Service has long maintained
that the president is in the greatest danger during his time in crowds, not in the White
House or in private meetings where this privilege presumably would have its greatest effect.
See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, PUBLIC REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE
SECURITY REVIEW 92 (1995). The Department of the Treasury reports:
Although ... Presidents have been exposed to deadly or life-threatening assaults
with frightening regularity, not one of these assaults has occurred within the
White House Complex. Indeed, each assassination or potentially deadly assassina-
tion attempt has occurred when the Presidential protectee was away from the
White House, in the proximity of a crowd.
Id.
54. Several White House stewards testified during the Independent Counsel investiga-
tion of President Clinton. See Susan B. Glasser, A Parade of Witnesses, WASH. POST, Aug. 2,
1998, at Al (reporting that White House steward Bayani Nelvis, who was assigned to the
pantry outside the Oval Office and "ha[d] a firsthand view of much of what [went] on in
the president's suite," was called to testify during the investigation); id (acknowledging
that other stewards testified as well).
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994).
56. For example, in 1973, Nixon White House Counsel John Dean testified before the
Watergate Grand Jury. KATIYJ. HARRIGER, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITIrCS
20 (2d ed. 2000). In 1973, U.S. District Judge John Sirica called President Nixon's per-
sonal secretary, Rose Mary Woods, to explain the infamous "gaps" in the Nixon Oval Office
tapes. STANLEY I. KuTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON
429-30 (1990). In 1998, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed Betty Currie,
President Clinton's personal secretary, to testify regarding the President's relationship with
Monica Lewinsky. James Bennet, The President Under Fire: The Prosecutor; With an Uneasy
Look, President's Secretary Goes Before a Grand Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1998, at A23.
57. See Official Website, United States Secret Service, at http://www.treas.gov/usss/
(last visited Nov. 28, 2000) (noting that "the assistance of... state, county, and local law
enforcement organizations is a vital part of the entire security operation").
58. See, e.g., WALTER S. BOWEN & HARRY EDWARD NEAL, THE UNITED STATES SECRET SER-
VICE (1960) (offering untold stories from Secret Service agents at the White House); SEY-
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privilege would achieve little for the president in terms of added guar-
antees of nondisclosure, but it would alter our traditional view of the
Secret Service and its function.
The proposed protective function privilege also would produce a
fundamental change in the status and role of our Secret Service. The
Secret Service was created in 1865 as a law enforcement agency to
combat counterfeiting. 59 For more than 125 years, the Secret Service
has functioned in the same capacity as all federal law enforcement
agencies without ever claiming any special status based upon the pro-
tective functions they perform for the president. Adoption of a sepa-
rate privilege would convert these law enforcement officers into
something akin to personal guards with all of the dangers and ambi-
guities of that new status.6" Both the Secret Service and its protective
function originated under a standard law enforcement model-law
enforcement duties performed by law enforcement personnel. 61 Due
MOUR M. HERSH, THE DARK SIDE OF CAMELOT (1997) (containing several first-hand
accounts of former agents regarding the personal affairs and sexual liaisons of President
Kennedy); DENNIS V.N. MCCARTHY & PHILIP W. SMITH, PROTECTING THE PRESIDENT: THE
INSIDE STORY OF A SECRET SERVICE AGENT (1985) (offering an inside view of the administra-
tions of Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan); GEORGE RUSH, CONFESSIONS OF AN Ex-
SECRET SERVICE AGENT: THE MARTY VENKER STORY (1988) (describing from first-hand ac-
counts, the career of Secret Service agent Marty Venker). Additionally, one of the Secret
Service agents subpoenaed by Independent Counsel Starr during the Lewinsky investiga-
tion was retired. See Susan Schmidt, Clinton, Lewinsky Met Alone, Guard Says; Retired Secret
Service Officer Recalls Visit ly Intern in Late '95, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1998, at Al (discussing
the testimony of former uniformed Secret Service Officer Lewis C. Fox).
59. BOWEN & NEAL, supra note 58, at 11. For an account of the events surrounding the
creation of the Secret Service, see id. at 1-11. For a general history of the Secret Service,
see MARCIA ROBERTS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, MO-
MENTS IN HISTORY- 1865-1990 (1990).
60. See Turley, Praetorian Privilege, supra note 2, at A23 (arguing that "[tihese new
Praetorians would come with dangerous legal and historical implications"). The Secret
Service motto, "Worthy of Trust and Confidence," refers to a public, not a personal, trust
accepted by every agent upon entering federal service. Not only did the Secret Service
begin as a law enforcement agency, but the Secret Service's protective function on the
White House grounds was originally performed by local police units as a standard law en-
forcement responsibility. ROBERTS, supra note 59, at 14. Until 1930 (when these duties
were transferred to the Secret Service), White House security was performed by District of
Columbia Metropolitan Police officers and a small military guard. Id. Similarly, the Secret
Service's protective function for foreign diplomats was previously performed by local po-
lice, who still support the Secret Service in its various duties. See id. at 15. The officer who
gave his life to protect President Harry Truman in 1950, Leslie Coffelt, was not a member
of the Secret Service, but a member of the White House Police, id. at 19, whose members
were recruited from the ranks of the Metropolitan Police Department. BOWEN & NEAL,
supra note 58, at 132.
61. See supra note 60 (discussing the origins of the agency). The relationship between
the local police and the Secret Service continues to this day. By statute the Secret Service
"possess[es] privileges and powers similar to those of the members of the Metropolitan
Police of the District of Columbia." 3 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). Secret Service agents are often
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to this history, the Secret Service has traditionally emphasized its law
enforcement traditions, as opposed to an image of a palace or presi-
dential guard. While many ancient and modern governments have
the model of a personal guard, this country has always preserved a
bright-line rule for all federal law enforcement personnel who are
called to give evidence in criminal investigations.62 History is rife with
examples of the excesses and dangers of a personal guard with special
legal status.6" The most famous historical model, the Praetorian
Guard of ancient Rome, was roughly the same size as the current Se-
cret Service.6 4 This specially trained outfit ultimately became inti-
mately involved in the governance of Rome, as well as in its
murderous conspiracies.6" Other nations have followed the personal
guard model and have established special palace or presidential
guards around their leaders, with highly destabilizing or undemo-
cratic results.66 The United States has stood proudly for a different
appointed from District police ranks and share some of the same salary, employment bene-
fits, and privileges as District police. See Floyd v. District of Columbia, 129 F.3d 152, 154
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
62. See Turley, Praetorian Privilege, supra note 2, at A23 ("[A]s law enforcement officers,
Secret Service members were compelled to share any possible evidence of criminal con-
duct in their possession."). The model of a personal, presidential guard whose members
swear loyalty to a leader, not his office, has been a common one throughout history. See
generally F.C. Avis, HISTORICAL BODYGUARDS (2d ed. 1974) (providing examples of such
systems and discussing their destabilizing influence throughout history).
63. See generally Avis, supra note 62 passim.
64. The Preaetorian Guard under Augustus contained nine cohorts of 500 men each,
for a total of 4500 to 5000 men. GRAHAM WEBSTER, THE ROMAN IMPERtAL ARMY OF THE
FIRsT AND SECOND CENTURIES A.D. 97 (3d ed. 1985). The Secret Service employs approxi-
mately the same amount: 2100 special agents, 1200 Uniformed Division officers, and ap-
proximately 1700 other technical, professional, and administrative support personnel.
Official Website, United States Secret Service, at http://www.treas.gov/usss/faq.htm (last
visited Nov. 28, 2000).
65. See BRIAN CAMPBELL, THE ROMAN ARMY, 31 BC-AD 337: A SOURCEBOOK 40 (1994)
(noting that upon his capture of Rome in 193 A.D., Septimius Severus immediately moved
to disband the old Praetorian Guard, "which had already connived at the overthrow of two
emperors"); WEBSTER, supra note 64, at 96 (noting that the "political importance of the
Guard was always a factor in the choice of an emperor, whatever the Senate may have
thought or decided").
66. Notably, many of the most repressive world leaders have created and deployed spe-
cial presidential guards against political opponents, reporters, and other perceived threats.
See, e.g., Douglas Farah, Slaying Gives Life to Opposition; Death of Crusading Journalist Puts
Pressure on Burkina Faso President, WASH. POST, June 4, 2000, at A23 (noting evidence that a
leading journalist and human rights activist was assassinated by members of the Burkina
Faso presidential guard). Often such special detachments have become increasingly inde-
pendent and have repeatedly overthrown governments, removed political leaders, or
started civil unrest, which has included the commission of genocidal crimes. See, e.g., Frank
Smyth, French Guns, Rwandan Blood, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1994, at A21 (noting that "[h]ours
after the President was killed last Wednesday, his Presidential Guard went on a rampage.
They killed Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, along with Belgian peacekeepers who had
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principle. Due to such historical examples as the Praetorians, this
country has long followed the alternative model of a professional law
enforcement agency with special responsibilities, but no special status
within the federal system.67 The Clinton administration stood on the
wrong side of history in asserting this special privilege.
Recent history has demonstrated how even large agencies, like
the Central Intelligence Agency can be co-opted into participating in
illegal conduct at the behest of the White House.' As a result of
Watergate, federal standards were enacted to further clarify the public
duties of these agencies and their separation from White House or
political operations.69 In comparison to other law enforcement or in-
telligence agencies, the Secret Service is at far greater risk of such
manipulation if it is placed into the ambiguous role inherent in the
proposed privilege. Because of their continual and close proximity to
the president, Secret Service agents can develop strong personal rela-
tionships that could overwhelm the judgment of even the most consci-
entious law enforcement officers. The new privilege would only
strengthen this relationship to an uncomfortable degree. As with the
Secret Service's historical antecedents in other countries, a special
tried to save her; most other opposition party members, priests and nuns, journalists and
human rights monitors."); Ivory Coast Ruler Tells of Assassination Attempt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 2000, at A4 (describing the role of the Ivory Coast presidential guard in an assassina-
tion attempt); Niger's President Assassinated by Soldiers; Premier Dissolves Parliament and Sus-
pends Political Activity, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1999, at A3 (reporting the announcement of the
State Department that Niger's president "was assassinated by members of his presidential
guard"); Roving Gangs Raising Rwanda's Death Toll CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 1994, at A3 (noting
that "the Hutu-dominated presidential guard was being blamed for the massacre" of civil-
ians during the genocidal crimes in Rwanda).
67. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing the prevailing model of
the Secret Service).
68. Perhaps the best known example was President Nixon's use of the CIA to gather
domestic intelligence on political opposition and dissent. SeeATrAN THEOHARIS, SPYING ON
AMERICANS: POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE FROM HOOVER TO THE HUSTON PLAN 13-39, 186-95
(1978) (detailing the CIA's illegal domestic intelligence operations performed at the com-
mand of President Nixon). After Congress blocked aid to the Nicaraguan Contras in 1984,
the Reagan White House used the CIA to manage the aid operation covertly, using funds
from secret arms shipments to Iran. See LAWRENCE E. WALSH, IRAN-CONTRA: THE FINAL
REPORT 199-311 (1994) (providing a detailed account of the CIA's role in the Iran-Contra
operation).
69. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (1994) (restrict-
ing intelligence gathering directed against U.S. citizens); S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976)
(creating the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) to strengthen oversight of
the intelligence gathering community); Exec. Order No. 11,905, § 5, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703
(Feb. 18, 1976) (restricting intelligence surveillance of U.S. citizens); Exec. Order No.
12,036, §§ 2-202, 3, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (Jan. 24, 1978) (prohibiting the CIA from engaging
in any electronic surveillance within the United States and creating an Intelligence Over-
sight Board within the White House).
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privilege for the president's security staff could easily degrade into an
isolated environment ripe for abuse and subterfuge.
Moreover, it is precisely the function of the Secret Service that
makes this privilege so disabling for criminal investigations. Secret
Service agents often bar or restrict access to the president.7 ° This se-
curity function tends to reduce the number of potential witnesses to
criminal conduct, which, in turn, magnifies the importance of the Se-
cret Service agents as witnesses in a criminal investigation of alleged
criminal conduct of a president.7" Also, the inherent dangers of the
new privilege would likely grow with time. If Secret Service agents are
given special status, there would be an obvious incentive for the presi-
dent to rely on these employees to the greatest possible extent in
White House operations. To guarantee the privacy that they seek,
presidents could substitute Secret Service agents for other federal em-
ployees who are not shielded from criminal inquiries. It would be
natural for presidents to prefer Secret Service agents with this new
privilege to other security or White House staff who, as traditional
public employees, cannot refuse to supply relevant evidence to a crim-
inal investigation.7 2 As a result, the role of the Secret Service would
become increasingly defined by its one overriding distinction: a quasi-
immunity from testimony.
The Secret Service has a proud and unique role in American his-
tory as a law enforcement body.7" These professionals were shaped by
a tradition that rejected the model of a personal guard in favor of a
public servant model.7 4 That tradition would be eviscerated by the
70. See Official Website, United States Secret Service, at http://www.treas.gov/usss/
(last visited Nov. 28, 2000) (outlining some of the functions of the Secret Service with
respect to presidential protection and access).
71. The importance of the testimony of such witnesses is enhanced when a president,
as was the case with President Clinton, initially declines to appear before the grand jury to
respond to questions under oath. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Clinton May Drop Appeal on Privilege;
Strategy Could Avert Supreme Court Review, WASH. PosT, June 1, 1998, at Al (reporting Presi-
dent Clinton's resistance to requests by Independent Counsel Starr's requests to appear
before a grand jury);John F. Harris & Susan Schmidt, Star Seeks Clinton Testimony on Lewin-
sky; Lawyers Have Rebuffed Requests; Advisers Split on Merits of Grand Jury Vtsit, WASH. POST,
Mar. 12, 1998, at A8 (same).
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 35
(D.D.C.) ("White House attorneys, like all other executive branch employees, have a statu-
tory duty to report any criminal misconduct by other employees to the Attorney Gen-
eral."), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per
curiam).
73. See BOWEN & NE.AL, supra note 58, at v (noting the Secret Service's historical investi-
gative and law enforcement role in combating counterfeiting, fraud, espionage, and other
crimes).
74. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (explaining the current model of the
Secret Service as a law enforcement agency).
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proposed privilege, to the detriment of both the Service and the pub-
lic. Our presidents have always represented a tradition of citizen-lead-
ers, protected by law enforcement personnel with public, not
personal, duties. Despite the efforts of the current management of
the Secret Service, this is a tradition worth preserving as a quintessen-
tial and core American symbol.75 To that end, the next president
could serve both the public interest and the traditions of the Secret
Service in opposing efforts to resurrect the protective function
privilege.
76
B. The Role of the Office of White House Counsel
Any discussion of the future role of executive privilege must nec-
essarily include a determination of the role of the Office of White
House Counsel. This office is inevitably involved in efforts to secure
documents from the White House; these documents are often gener-
ated or held by lawyers in the office.77 Where such documents are
sought, the White House counsel often raises both attorney-client and
executive privilege arguments as an initial position.78 Nevertheless,
past White House counsels have long preferred to leave questions of
privilege unresolved and to operate within the ambiguity of executive
privilege to negotiate compromises with Congress or the judiciary.79
75. The construction of any new privilege will rest with Congress. The Supreme Court
opted, by a 7-2 vote, not to consider this issue. See Rubin v. United States, 525 U.S. 990, 990
(1998) (denying Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin's petition for writ of certiorari to
consider whether federal law recognizes the protective function privilege); Joan Biskupic,
Court Lets Stand Rulings on Secret Service, Lawyers' Testimony, WAsH. POsT, Nov. 10, 1998, at A4
(noting that only Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer voted to hear the
case).
76. Such a resurrection would only come from Congress, where the matter was appro-
priately left by the D.C. Circuit. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(per curiam) ("[W]e leave to the Congress the question whether a protective function
privilege is appropriate in order to ensure the safety of the President and, if so, what the
contours of that privilege should be.").
77. See Editorial, A Very Privileged Executive, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1996, at A22 (noting
that "White House Counsel Jack Quinn claimed executive privilege for 2,000 Travelgate
documents that had been subpoenaed by [the] House Government Reform and Oversight
Committee"). The misuse of executive privilege became one of the issues for impeach-
ment before Congress. See Text of the Draft Articles of Impeachment, CHI. TIUB., Dec. 10, 1998,
at 4.
78. See Francine Kiefer, Staff's Slow Pace Boosts Clinton, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 8,
1998, at 3 ("By fighting subpoenas and invoking claims of executive privilege, lawyer-client
privilege, and spousal privilege, the White House counsel has been able to slow indepen-
dent prosecutor Kenneth Starr enough to buy the president a significant chunk of time.");
GOP Stumbles While White House Stonewalls Investigators, USA TODAY, May 6, 1998, at 12A
(criticizing the extensive use of privilege by the Clinton administration).
79. C. Boyden Gray, former White House Counsel to President Bush, noted that
"'[t] he real value of executive privilege is its exquisite ambiguity... and in the bargaining
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Certainly, the Clinton administration cannot be faulted for trying to
defend the confidentiality of certain information sought during the
Clinton crisis. Rather, the fault with the Clinton White House coun-
sels lies in their failure to avoid such issues of privilege by allowing
unnecessary, and at times inappropriate, roles for White House coun-
sel staff.8" Future executive privilege fights will be heavily influenced
by the role that the next White House counsel defines for his office
and staff.
Created during the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt,"1 the
role of the White House counsel has historically been controversial
and dangerously fluid.82 This uncertain role was at the heart of many
of the controversies during the Clinton administration and was a con-
tributor to the blurring of defenses belonging to the President in his
official capacity, rather than as an individual. Perhaps the greatest
example of the confusion over the role of this office was found in
Bernard Nussbaum.8" Fiercely loyal to the First Couple, Nussbaum
that goes on with Congress or others trying to define it.'" James Toedtman, Legal Experts
Concerned Presidential Power Eroding, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Aug. 3, 1998, at IA (quoting C. Boy-
den Gray).
80. Perhaps the most unnecessary and controversial role was the decision by the White
House counsel to remove material from the office of Vincent Foster after his suicide, but
before the arrival of criminal investigators. Peter Baker, One Death Altered Path of Presidency;
Five Years Later, Clinton White House Still Facing Aftermath of Foster Suicide, WASH. POST, July 20,
1998, at Al ("The way the White House seemed to stand in the way of the Justice Depart-
ment and others investigating Foster's death and the belated discovery that Whitewater
files had been removed from his office.., generated a brush fire of speculation that there
must be something the Clintons were hiding."). There is no question that the White
House counsel had an interest in being present and objecting to the removal of any confi-
dential material during the criminal investigation. However, the decision to unilaterally
remove material was ill-advised and undermined the need of the White House to convey an
open and cooperative message in the ensuing scandal. While some controversies during
the Clinton years were not well-based and appeared more politically driven, some allega-
tions of interference by White House counsel staff were made, not by Congress, but by
other executive branch employees. See, e.g., Jerry Seper, Clinton Counsel Ordered to Testify;
Lindsey Named in Commerce Suit, WASH. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 2000, at A7 (noting an affidavit from a
government employee that alleged various improprieties by White House counsel staff,
including a sworn statement that the employee knew that Cheryl Mills, "in her position as
deputy counsel to the president, advised Commerce officials to withhold certain docu-
ments .... In many years working with the federal government, I have never known or
heard of a federal agency collaborating or discussing releasing or withholding documents
with White House officials.").
81. NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAw AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S OFFCE, 1789-1990, at 13 (1992).
82. SeeJeremy Rabkin, White House Lawyering: Law, Ethics, and Political Judgments, in Gov-
ERNMENT LAwYERs: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL PoLu'ics 107-42
(Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995) (presenting an overview of the fluid nature of the office
and the dilemma faced when having to represent the presidency, but not the president
independently).
83. White House Counsel under President Clinton, 1993-1994.
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evidenced little concern for distinguishing between areas properly
handled by White House counsel and areas appropriately left to either
private counsel or federal investigators.8 4 Taking a position that was
roundly criticized, Nussbaum viewed his role as largely the same as
that of a private lawyer.8 5 Nussbaum's failure to distinguish between
these two roles ultimately led to his resignation in the midst of ques-
tions concerning his participation in meetings about the criminal in-
vestigation of the First Couple for acts that occurred before President
Clinton took office.8 6 Nussbaum personified the Clinton administra-
84. See Oliphant, supra note 3, at 20 ("The [Clinton] administration's critics have al-
ways held that the president's legal advisers were ill-served by involving themselves in mat-
ters involving the Whitewater probe, Paula Jones' harassment suit, and the Monica
Lewinsky investigation."). Nussbaum was widely criticized for his style and lack of
judgment:
Nussbaum, in many ways, set the tone for the Clinton chief counsel. A high-
powered litigator from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz and a stranger to the Clin-
ton circle, he aggressively defended the president from attack. He resigned in
1994 amid charges that he had improperly interfered in several Whitewater-re-
lated investigations. He was criticized for going through the office of Deputy
White House Counsel Vince Foster following Foster's suicide.
Id. Even Nussbaum's friend, Webster Hubbell, criticized him as "too eager to get involved
in matters from which he should have withdrawn." Neil A. Lewis, At the Bar; Wherein a 'New
York Style Litigator' Is Cast as the Heavy in the Whitewater Affair, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1995, at
B18 (citing Hubbell's testimony before the Senate committee investigating Whitewater).
85. See Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REv. 17, 18
(1995) (citing criticism by C. Boyden Gray, White House Counsel during the Bush admin-
istration, and Lloyd Cutler, Nussbaum's successor as White House Counsel under Presi-
dent Clinton). Former White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray criticized Nussbaum for
"'confus[ing] his fiduciary role as a temporary occupant of that office with the no-holds-
barred role a private litigant would have. He is not [the Clintons'] private lawyer. He is
the lawyer for the Oval Office.'" Naftali Bendavid, Whitewater Meets the Washington Legal
Culture, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 14, 1994, at 1 (quoting C. Boyden Gray).
86. See Nelson Lund, Guardians of the Presidency: The Office of the Counsel to the President
and the Office of Legal Counsel, in GOVERNMENT LAwYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BuREAucRAcY
AND PRESIDENTIAL PouTics 209-10 (Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995) (explaining that Nuss-
baum was forced to resign after widespread denunciation of meetings he had held with
officials of an independent regulatory agency investigating the Clintons' financial deal-
ings). As the New York Times reported:
As White House counsel, Mr. Nussbaum deployed his use-every-legal-means-at-my-
disposal defense of the Clintons in several ways. When Mr. Nussbaum met with
Treasury Department lawyers to determine the progress of investigations into a
failed Arkansas savings and loan association, Madison Guaranty, he was perhaps
doing what he did as a corporate litigator for Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz in
New York: trying to find out as much as he could about the case against his cli-
ents. But as White House counsel, he represents the President; thus, his action
raised profound questions about tampering with a Government investigation.
Lewis, supra note 84, at B18. The Times also reported in March 1994:
Last month, it was disclosed that the United States Park Police, who had investi-
gated the apparent suicide last July of Vincent W. Foster Jr., the deputy White
House counsel, had accused Mr. Nussbaum in a confidential report of having
impeded their inquiries. The report said, for example, that Mr. Nussbaum in-
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tion's persistent problem with fluid lines of concern for the White
House staff.
87
This problem was certainly not confined to the White House
counsel's office; various White House officials were tied to efforts to
discredit individuals in the scandals of Clinton's presidency.8 8 There
sisted that lawyers from the White House counsel's office sit in on police inter-
views with staff members, perhaps intimidating them from being candid.
Neil A. Lewis, Nussbaum's New York Tactics Falter in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, at
A24.
87. It is notable that Charles Ruff appeared to take a more restricted view. Former
White House Special Counsel Lanny Davis, who carried out an aggressive defense of the
President on all fronts, noted that his efforts to get information from Ruff were often not
rewarded. Ruff, he noted, was " ' very stubborn' in 'his reticence to share information with
me.'" Howard Kurtz, Lanny Davis's Original Spin, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1999, at Cl (quot-
ing Lanny Davis).
88. The leading figure cited for engaging in White House smear tactics was Sidney
Blumenthal, who was repeatedly accused of having a role in the genesis or distribution of
false stories about individuals ranging from House Judiciary Chairman Henry Hyde to anti-
Clinton Democratic Congressman Paul McHale. While Blumenthal denied under oath
that he was the source of attack stories targeting Monica Lewinsky, see Al Kamen, Blumen-
thal Remarks Challenged by Friend; Clinton Aide Had Described Lewinsky as 'Stalker, 'Journalist Says
in Affidavit, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1999, at A10 (noting Blumental's denial in his testimony),
various reporters contradicted him, and several House managers attempted to introduce
evidence that Blumenthal had lied about his role in sparking the rumors. See id. (discuss-
ing the affidavit of reporter Christopher Hitchens, Blumenthal's friend, who stated that
Blumenthal did speak with him about a smear story that painted Monica Lewinsky as a
'stalker"); Nightline: The Trial-Fighting to the Bitter End (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 8,
1999) (reporting that House managers were asking for subpoenas for "U]ournalists who
said White House Aide Sidney Blumenthal had told them the misleading story, casting
Monica Lewinsky as the stalker"). Blumenthal similarly denied spreading rumors of Henry
Hyde's extramarital affair and was similarly contradicted in the media. See ABC This Week:
Chairman Hyde's Extramarital Affair (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 20, 1998) (discussing
Blumenthal's denial of spreading rumors about Hyde, but reporting that "news organiza-
tions.., including ABC News, have told their viewers or readers that Sidney Blumenthal in
fact, has spoken to reporters about this type of rumor" and quoting an article by Doug
Ireland in The Nation, which reported that "'[t]hree members of the media have con-
firmed to me that Sidney Blumenthal . . . had indeed been spreading such stories'").
In addition to rumors spread about the sex life of Judiciary Chairman Henry Hyde,
the White House was accused of spreading a false story that Democratic Congressman Paul
McHale had lied about his war record. See Howard Kurtz, Clinton Critic in House, McHale,
Assails Attack on Military Record, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1998, at A9 (quoting Congressman
McHale as stating that it was " ' reprehensible' for a presidential ally to leak false charges"
about his military service); House Republicans See Assault on Hyde; Call for FBI Inquiry, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAzErrE, Sept. 18, 1998, at Al (reporting on a letter sent by House Republicans
that "singled out White House Aide Sidney Blumenthal for suspicion," an allegation de-
nied by Blumenthal). McHale was one of the few Democrats to call for the impeachment
of President Clinton. See Kevin Sack, Testing of a President: The Dissident; An Iconoclastic Demo-
cratic Congressman Takes a Dramatic Stand, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1998, at A21. Speculation
again tied Sidney Blumenthal to the story. Press Briefing by Mike McCurny, Federal Docu-
ment Clearing House, Sept. 8, 1998 (statement of White House Press Secretary Mike Mc-
Curry responding to press reports tying Blumenthal to the McHale story and other
attacks). CNBC ran the false story and stated that the information came from a source
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was little apparent concern that these governmental employees should
be addressing official matters and leaving the personal defense of the
President to his private counsel,8 9 except where legitimate issues of
privilege are raised.9"
What is curious about the failure of the Clinton administration to
protect this line between official and unofficial duties in the Office of
White House Counsel is that the President and First Lady had a bat-
tery of private counsel to ably protect those interests not connected to
"'very close to the president.'" Howard Kurtz, Hyde Story Stirs Hostilities; GOP-White House
Trade Charges of Leaks, Smear Attacks, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1998, at Al (quoting CNBC talk
show host Geraldo Rivera). White House staff appeared to exercise little restraint in their
involvement in any scandal involving the President. Thus, it was common to see officials
like White House Spokesperson Ann Lewis attacking women who accused the President of
misconduct. See Editorial, Presidential Character, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 17, 1998, at A24 ("Ann
Lewis used the 'Today' show yesterday to... do to Ms. Willey what former Senator John
Danforth and other Republicans did to Anita Hill.... [T]here will be a continuing effort
to paint [Willey] as an erotically obsessed person who continued to write and call her
accused attacker."); CAN Today, White House Challenges Willey's Credibility (CNN television
broadcast, Mar. 16, 1998) (noting that Lewis "suggest[ed] that Kathleen Willey was friendly
after this alleged incident in 1993"). What is astonishing is not simply that these attacks
were made by high White House officials, but that the officials did not appear concerned
that this role was well outside of their function as public employees.
89. The alternative view of the role of counsel to the president can seem almost quaint
by current standards. Edward Bates became attorney general with the understanding that
-[t] he office I hold is not properly political, but strictly legal; and it is my duty, above all
other ministers of State to uphold the Law and to resist all encroachments, from whatever
quarter, of mere will and power.'" Arthur Selwyn Miller, The Attorney General as the Presi-
dent's Lawyer, in RoES OF THE ATroRNE GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 41, 51 (1968)
(emphasis omitted) (unsourced quotation from Edward Bates).
90. The unofficial smear efforts of White House staff was reportedly the subject of testi-
mony before a federal grand jury. See William Neikirk & Michael Tackett, GOP, Democrats
Race to Leak Tidbits; Both Parties Reveal New Starr Evidence Favorable to Their Own Views, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 30, 1998, at 4. Dick Morris, President Clinton's former political consultant,
told a federal grand jury "that he believed the White House maintained a 'secret police
operation to go around and intimidate women' who had some kind of secret relationship
with the president." Id. Morris identified the members of this operation as "private investi-
gators Terry Lenzer and Jack Palladino and White House Deputy Chief of Staff Bruce Lind-
sey." Id Morris also testified that "he knew of two instances, one involving himself, in
which the White House had leaked damaging information." Id Other incidents included
the release of Linda Tripp's personnel file by Defense Department spokesman Kenneth
Bacon. Id. Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr further accused the White House of a
number of leaks. See Impeachment Notebook; Starr Says Other Guy's to Blame for Leaks, STAR
TiuB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 28, 1999, at 14A (reporting Starr's assertion in court documents
that "there is a strong prima facie case that the president and his agents.., are responsible
for many of the alleged 'leaks'" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Military Pay Raise Issue Awaits Senate After Trial USA TODAY, Jan. 28, 1999, at 10A
(reporting that "Starr filed papers saying the Clinton White House 'has employed a con-
centrated strategy of leaking harmful material to the media at an early stage to reduce
long-term damage'").
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the President's official duties.9 Yet on certain issues, the White
House counsel staff allowed itself to cross over the line into the realm
of private counsel.92 This action brought about damaging judicial
rulings.
The court losses of the Clinton administration offer some obvious
lessons for the future. In In re Grand Juiy Subpoena Duces Tecum,93 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered
whether the Office of Independent Counsel could secure documents
from the White House counsel through a federal grand jury sub-
poena.94 These documents were the notes of Miriam Nemetz, Associ-
ate Counsel to the President, and the notes ofJane Sherburne, Special
Counsel to the President.95 The notes were taken during meetings
with First Lady Hillary Clinton and her private counsel, David
Kendall.96 The meetings dealt with the Whitewater scandal and the
investigation of the First Couple for alleged criminal conduct before
the election of President Clinton.97 Ultimately, the White House
dropped its executive privilege claims,9" and the case turned on attor-
ney-client privilege and work-product arguments.99 The Court of Ap-
peals, however, delivered a strong rebuke to the White House for
91. The President's private attorneys included Robert Bennett of Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom, who represented the President in the Paula Jones sexual harassment
case; David Kendall and Nicole Seligman of Williams & Connolly, who represented the
Clintons during the Whitewater and subsequent OIC investigations, including the House
and Senate impeachment proceedings; and Mickey Kantor, who served Clinton as trade
negotiator and then Commerce Secretary before joining the President's legal team. See
Francis X. Clines, Clintons'Counsel Keeps His Own, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1997, at A8 (compar-
ing the discreet manner of David Kendall with the more media-savvy attitudes of Robert
Bennett and Kenneth Starr); Lloyd Grove & David Segal, The President's Lawyer; Bennett
Jumps a Hurdle on His Victory Lap, WASH. Posr, Apr. 3, 1998, at A34 (discussing Robert
Bennett's representation in the Paula Jones case); Richard W. Stevenson, President Triple-
Teams His Lewinsky Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1998, at A20 (discussing Clinton's reliance
on David Kendall, Mickey Kantor, and Nicole Seligman).
92. See Susan Schmidt & Ruth Marcus, First Lady's Subpoena Raises Political Stakes; Sched-
uled GrandJuy Appearance Also Adds to Tension Within the Clintons' Legal Team, WASH. POST,
Jan. 24, 1996, at A4 (noting "frayed relations between White House and [the Clintons']
private lawyers" and characterizing the Clinton legal team as a "hydra-headed creature,
with conflicting strategies and no clear leader").
93. 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997).
94. Id. at 915.
95. Id. at 914.
96. Id.
97. Id. The first meeting between Mrs. Clinton, Ms. Sherburne, Ms. Nemetz, and Mr.
Kendall concerned Mrs. Clinton's activities following Vincent W. Foster, Jr.'s death. Id.
The second meeting, attended by Ms. Sherburne, Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Kendall, Mr. Kendall's
partner Nicole Seligman, and, at times, John Quinn, Counsel to the President, concerned




attempting to define the role of government lawyers as including the
right to withhold evidence relevant to criminal investigations.1"' Criti-
cal to the court's analysis was precedent that limited such privilege
arguments in criminal matters.101 This issue-whether executive
privilege permits government attorneys to withhold evidence in crimi-
nal investigations-had been addressed with similar results in In re
Lindsey.10 2 In Lindsey, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr sought to
overcome both executive privilege and attorney-client privilege asser-
tions by Bruce Lindsey, Deputy White House Counsel. 10 3 Once again,
the question ultimately turned on the attorney-client privilege, which
the majority ruled was overcome by "[t] he public interest in honest
government and in exposing wrongdoing by government officials.""0 4
The White House counsel's office must now take greater care to
define its function in any given meeting to avoid a waiver of privilege.
When meeting with private counsel for the president or discussing
potentially criminal matters, the White House counsel is now subject
to greater presumed restrictions on his or her ability to act with a
guarantee of confidentiality. 1 5 Certainly, the president's right to "ac-
curate, frank, and robust advice" 106 must be protected. However, the
White House counsel staff must adopt some new methods to better
compartmentalize different functions of its office and to avoid some
functions altogether."0 7 Some of these new steps are obvious. When
100. See id at 921 ("We ... believe that to allow any part of the federal government to
use its in-house attorneys as a shield against the production of information relevant to a
federal criminal investigation would represent a gross misuse of public assets.").
101. See id at 919 (discussing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
102. 158 F.3d 1263, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam). The court in Lindsey found
that:
the Office of the President is a part of the federal government, consisting of gov-
ernment employees doing government business, and neither legal authority nor
policy nor experience suggests that a federal government entity can maintain the
ordinary common law attorney-client privilege to withhold information relating
to a federal criminal offense.
Id.
103. Id. at 1267.
104. Id. at 1266.
105. See Michael K. Forde, The White House Counsel and Whitewater: Government Lawyers
and the Scope of Privileged Communications, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y RV. 109, 162 (1997) (discus-
sing the likely implications of recent privilege precedents and finding that "[i]t is thus
clear that the White House will face an uphill battle in making a privilege claim that it can
justify publicly").
106. Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Prerogative of
Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REv. 631, 640 (1997).
107. Cf In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 1997)
(noting that in the context of government attorney-client privilege, "[m ] ore particularized
rules may be necessary where one agency of government claims the privilege in resisting a
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asked to give advice on personal matters with potential criminal liabil-
ity, White House counsel staff should demur. During the Clinton ad-
ministration, there was little reason (beyond a possible reluctance to
decline participation in a meeting desired by the First Lady) for the
White House staff to involve itself in some of the joint meetings with
private counsel. In the future, the White House counsel will have to
implement a more rigorous "traffic cop" system in which certain pri-
vate matters are sent to private counsel, or, at the very least, given to a
White House counsel designated to handle such ambiguous cases.
Such a policy will require the creation of firewalls to isolate lawyers
exposed to such information and to avoid serious injury to either the
president's interests or to those of the White House counsel.
One significant change should come not from the White House,
but from Congress. The position of White House counsel should be
made an appointed post that requires Senate confirmation. The high-
est legal positions at the Justice Department are filled by presidential
nomination under the Appointments Clause.1"8 Described as "among
the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme,' 0 9
the Appointments Clause allows Congress to check abuses of the exec-
utive branch and to reaffirm the obligations of executive officials."'
The White House counsel, however, continues to be appointed with-
out Senate confirmation, despite the position's importance to a vari-
ety of public policy matters."' This state of affairs tends to reaffirm
the White House counsel's role as one of personal obligation to the
president-akin to a quasi-private counsel, as opposed to a govern-
demand for information by another" (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW Gov-
ERNING LAWYERS § 124 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996))).
108. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the president "shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... all other Officers of the
United States").
109. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997).
110. See id. at 660. The Framers considered the Appointments Clause to be central to
the constitutional scheme and the system of checks and balances. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST
No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing why the Appointments Clause would prevent any
branch of government from monopolizing appointment power).
111. In fact, the last White House counsel for President Clinton, Beth Nolan, was moved
into this position after being delayed by controversy in the Senate over her appointment as
head of the Office of Legal Counsel at the United States Department ofJustice. See Turley,
supra note 41. While Ms. Nolan was clearly well-suited for this position and should have
had little trouble with confirmation, the shift from a Senate-approved position to a discre-
tionary position highlights the problem in this area. It was in the best interests of both Ms.
Nolan and the relationship between the branches for a resolution to be reached on any
lingering concerns. A confirmation hearing would have cleared any question as to Ms.
Nolan's suitability for the office and would have established the agreement of Congress
that she was both well-qualified and beyond any taint of prior controversy.
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ment attorney serving in a high government office." 2 Any confirma-
tion of a White House counsel would likely be given generous
treatment by the Senate, but requiring Senate confirmation would
make the appointment of this office a joint decision by the president
and the public. Such a confirmation would also bolster the authority
of the White House counsel in refusing certain roles suggested by the
president or the first lady. The next president could demonstrate a
commitment to clarifying the role of White House counsel by propos-
ing such a change, thus yielding a presidential prerogative in the in-
terest of good government.
C. The Role of the First Lady
The role of the first lady has become increasingly controversial as
modern first ladies have begun to perform official or quasi-official
functions. Most first ladies have tended to follow a nonpolicy course
in establishing their role. This is true even of modem first ladies like
Jacqueline Kennedy, who insisted that she "'wanted to be First Wife
and First Mother, not First Lady.""' 3  While first ladies have long
served as advisors to their spouses," 4 direct policy roles in govern-
ment have been a rarity. No first lady has had the pronounced policy-
based role of Hillary Clinton." 5 To her credit, Clinton was open
112. In comparison, assistant attorneys general are required to be confirmed by the Sen-
ate. 28 U.S.C. § 506 (1994).
113. John Dwight Ingram, The American "First Lady,"27 CAP. U. L. REv. 487, 500 (1999)
(citing GIL TROY, AFFAIRS OF STATE 2 (1997)).
114. See T. Natasha Patel, First Lady, Last Rights? Extending Executive Immunity to the First
Lady, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 585, 592-94 (1998) (discussing the active roles that Edith
Galt Wilson and Eleanor Roosevelt played in their husbands' presidencies). Even Rosalynn
Carter, who played a far less official role in her husband's administration, was criticized for
assuming ambassadorial responsibilities on limited occasions. Ingram, supra note 113, at
497.
115. See generally Ruth Marcus, Now 'A Different Kind of First Lady; Hillary Clinton's Role Is
Likely to Be Activist, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1993, at F20 (discussing Hillary Clinton's substan-
tial role as adviser to her husband throughout his career in state politics and her poten-
tially active role as adviser to her husband during his presidential administration). Some
first ladies have had controversial roles due to their influence. This included Edith Galt
Wilson, who, after the President suffered a stroke in 1919:
became the "gatekeeper" to the President, and only she and his doctors ever knew
how strong a role she played. She was his close confidante and knew his thoughts
on many subjects. She continued to read everything addressed to the President,
sought his opinion on those questions she considered important, and then in-
formed the official involved of the President's decision.
Ingram, supra note 113, at 502 (citations omitted); see also Patel, supra note 114, at 592
(discussing Edith Galt Wilson's role as "the President's sole advisor"). Eleanor Roosevelt is
also often cited as an example of a more politically active first lady, though she was ulti-
mately forced to resign as head of an office for the advancement of women and women's
issues. See Patel, supra note 114,. at 593-94. As noted, Rosalynn Carter also drew strong
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about her different perception of the role of the first lady and her
view that the election elevated both the president and his wife to
higher office.1 16 Clinton's more active role as first lady, however, pro-
duced a major court challenge as to her official duties and contrib-
uted substantially to some of the recent privilege conflicts.
The issue of the first lady's role came to a head during the first
term of the Clinton administration when Hillary Clinton was made the
Chair of the President's Task Force on National Health Care Re-
form. 1 7 This task force was enormously important; it would deter-
mine whether a national health care system was needed and, if so,
would establish the parameters of such a system.' 1 8 At the time,
health care was one of the leading political issues before Congress and
the public." 9 When various health care and policy reform groups
sued for access to the deliberations of the task force, 2 ° the First
Lady's role became an issue under the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA), which requires that "advisory committee" meetings be
open to the public.121 The government argued that the Task Force
was not an advisory committee subject to FACA, and that "the Task
Force was exempt from FACA because all of its members-including
Mrs. Clinton-were government officers and employees."1 22  Ulti-
criticism at home and abroad when she assumed ambassadorial responsibilities during her
husband's administration. See supra note 114.
116. See Sally Quinn, Campaign Puzzle: Is America Ready For Hillary Clinton ?; The Candidate's
Wife Is the Very Model of the Modern Working Woman, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1992, at CI (refer-
encing Clinton's " ' If-you-vote-for-him-you-get me' remark" and finding that this remark
'gave some the impression that she planned to be co-president").
117. See Dana Priest, Clinton Names Wife to Head Health Panel; President Says Plan Is Due at
End of May, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1993, at Al. Hillary Clinton's role in health care issues
was not her only high-profile involvement in the administration. The First Lady also had a
prominent role in the selection of nominees like Judge Kimba Wood for attorney general.
See Carl David Wasserman, Note, Firing the First Lady: The Role and Accountability of the Presi-
dential Spouse, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1215, 1219 (1995) ("It was leaked that [First Lady Clinton]
spent more time interviewing Judge Kimba Wood ... than the President did.").
118. SeeAss'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 901 (D.C. Cir.
1993) ("President Clinton charged this body with the task of 'listen[ing] to all parties' and
then 'prepar[ing] health care reform legislation to be submitted to Congress within 100
days of our taking office.'" (alteration in original) (quoting 29 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.
96 (Feb. 1, 1993))).
119. The promise of health care reform legislation was a major part of the Clinton cam-
paign platform. Id
120. See id. The groups demanding access were "the Association of American Physicians
and Surgeons, which represents physicians; the American Council for Health Care Reform,
which represents health care consumers; and the National Legal & Policy Center, which
seeks to promote ethics in government." Id.
121. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(1) (1994).
122. Ass'n of Am. Physicians, 997 F.2d at 901.
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mately, because Hillary Clinton was deemed a close advisor to the
President, she was exempted from FACA disclosure requirements.12 3
I must confess that I have considerable unease with the pro-
nounced policy role of a first lady as a federal official. 124 There is no
question that the first spouse will always be a close advisor, if not the
closest advisor, to the president. Moreover, the time when a first
spouse had no career independent of the president is largely past. It
is inevitable that first spouses will enjoy outside activities and will have
professional careers. Yet the formal assumption of governmental re-
sponsibilities creates a host of legal and policy issues that make the
costs of an official role prohibitive in our system.' 25 Not only does
such a role raise questions under prohibitions of nepotism' 26 and
under other laws such as the Antideficiency Act, 127 but the first lady
also assumes a position as an executive branch official who is not
elected, not confirmed, not subject to impeachment, and not freely
123. Id. at 911. The White House later succeeded in securing recognition that commu-
nications with the first lady, as a senior advisor, are entitled to some protection under
executive privilege. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 27-28 (D.D.C.)
(citing Ass'n of Am. Physicians in finding that because the first lady is considered a presiden-
tial advisor, conversations with her are protected under executive privilege), afi'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
124. The basis of this objection is not to Hillary Clinton assuming such a role, but is
directed at any first lady assuming official authority. Similarly, the enactment of the Fed-
eral Anti-Nepotism statute was not a condemnation of Robert Kennedy as attorney general.
5 U.S.C. § 3110(b) (1994) (barring public officials from appointing relatives to positions in
agencies over which the pubic official exercises jurisdiction or control). One can be a fan
of Kennedy's (as I am) and still believe (as I do) that President Kennedy exercised ex-
tremely poor judgment in appointing a sibling to that high office.
125. These issues are not limited in application to first ladies. Former Speaker Thomas
Foley showed poor judgment in allowing his spouse to serve as an unpaid chief of staff and
advisor. See Sara Krausert, Comment, From Baking Bread to Making Dough: Legal and Societal
Restrictions on the Employment of First Ladies, 5 U. CHi. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 243, 260-61
(1998). This resulted in a series of distracting allegations and objections. See id. (discuss-
ing the public controversy surrounding Mrs. Foley).
126. See supra note 124.
127. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1342 (1994) (limiting the ability of government officials to ex-
pend funds or accept volunteer services without express congressional approval). Laws
such as these create questions regarding the legality of the first lady assuming official posi-
tions within the executive office. Krausert, supra note 125, at 247-53 (discussing the legal
restrictions on government employment of first ladies). "[A] First Lady may be caught
between a rock and a hard place: she may not be able to hold a governmentjob which pays
because of the Anti-Nepotism Act, and yet she may also be unable to hold an unpaid job
because of the Antideficiency Act." Id. at 251. There is also some question as to the crimi-
nal conflict of interest statute's impact on the first lady's handling of official duties. 18
U.S.C. § 208(a) (1994) (preventing employees of the executive branch from personally
and substantially engaging in government decisions that affect their financial interests or
the financial interests of their spouse); Krausert, supra note 125, at 252-53 (discussing the
implications of the criminal conflict of interest statute on the first lady).
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criticized within the White House due to her spousal relationship. 121
Putting aside the legal issues, so enhancing the role of the first lady
has an unnecessary and destabilizing effect in a system based on
accountability.
Hillary Clinton, however, raised the contemporary fact that first
spouses will increasingly come to the White House with careers dis-
tinct from the president's. 129 Certainly, having a professional or inde-
pendent spouse did not prove disabling for world leaders like
Margaret Thatcher, l" ° and it should not be a barrier for the first
couple in the United States. However, there have been few substan-
tive legislative or policy changes to reflect the new modem look of
first couples. It is therefore important to reexamine the role of the
first spouse and the need to create clear lines as to the involvement of
White House personnel in issues relating to his or her private or pro-
fessional interests.
The next administration should address these issues by promul-
gating a formal policy on legal issues stemming from private or pre-
election interests of the first lady. Such matters should be subject to a
presumption that they will be given to private counsel with minimal
involvement of White House staff. The most difficult question arises
when the first lady assumes a more official role or plays a part in policy
decisionmaking."l These issues have long been left unresolved to
avoid difficult legal and social questions.' The Clinton crisis, how-
ever, shows that the legislative and executive branches should openly
128. See generally Wasserman, supra note 117 (discussing the legal ramifications of a first
lady's involvement in White House affairs-specifically, Hillary Clinton's open and active
involvement in the Clinton administration).
129. Ultimately, this new role would include her election as a United States Senator
during the term of her spouse, albeit shortly before the end of his final term. See, e.g.,
Ellen Gamerman, Hillary Clinton Sworn in amid Senate Ceremony; Through Tears, President Sees
Wife Become Only First Lady in Elective Office, BAiT. SUN, Jan. 4, 2001, at 6A.
130. Thatcher's husband was known for his avoidance of all things political and "was
never heard to utter a political sentiment within earshot of reporters." Alexander Mac-
Leod, Career-Juggling at Britain's 10 Downing Street, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 14, 2000,
at 1. Likewise, Prime MinisterJohn Major's wife "loathed publicity" and spent most of her
time pursuing her career as an author of books about opera singers. Id.
131. See Wasserman, supra note 117, at 1218-25 (discussing the problems posed by Hil-
lary Clinton's appointment as head of the President's Task Force on National Health Care
Reform with respect to the interpretation of FACA); cf. Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Sur-
geons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (considering the issue of whether the
President's Task Force on National Health Care Reform is an advisory group and thus
subject to FACA disclosure requirements).
132. Cf Ass'n of Am. Physicians, 997 F.2d at 905 ("[T]he government is uncomfortable at
having to choose whether Mrs. Clinton should be thought of as an officer or employee.
The government's discomfort is quite understandable."); Krausert, supra note 125, at 247-
56 (discussing the legal and societal restrictions on the first lady's employment options).
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address this issue. Compelling arguments exist for and against the
formal involvement of a first lady in governmental positions. 133 The
role of presidential spouses is not a question of executive privilege per
se. However, as we saw with First Lady Hillary Clinton, the ambiguities
surrounding a presidential spouse engaged in an official capacity can
produce difficult privilege questions. Some of these questions may be
worth reexamination. However, the next administration would be
well-served in starting with the more fundamental question of the
proper role of a presidential spouse in government. While I believe
that the next president would best serve the interests of government
by promising not to use his spouse in such an official capacity, it is an
issue that should be part of a serious dialogue among the political
branches. Frankly, it would be a healthy and long-overdue debate.
D. The Role of the Chief Executive
Obviously, the most important and defining moment for the next
president will be how he defines his role vis-A-vis executive privilege.
One of the most important tasks for a new administration is to estab-
lish executive privilege as a narrow doctrine tied closely to the official
functions and interests of the president as an office-holder, as op-
posed to the president as an individual.1 3 ' The greatest damage
caused by the Clinton administration was the reduction of executive
privilege to a tactical device used in highly extenuated circumstances.
The result was a fundamental undermining of both the privilege and
the office that it was designed to protect.
Past presidents have had radically different views of the scope of
their authority in withholding information as a constitutional preroga-
133. See, e.g., Ass'n of Am. Physicians, 997 F.2d at 903-05 (describing the Government's
assertions that, due to Mrs. Clinton's status as the first lady, her position is the functional
equivalent of a government officer or employee, and that her assistance to the President is
not limited to mere ceremonial duties, as well as the appellees' assertion that Congress
intended that a first lady only be allowed to aid a president with the discharge of his cere-
monial duties).
134. The Supreme Court articulated the importance of this relationship in United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974). The Nixon Court explained:
The President's need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for
great deference from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely on
the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such
conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to
protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it diffi-
cult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidential-
ity of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of
such material [related to high-level communications] for in camera inspection
with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide.
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tive.' 3 5 Tensions between the chief executive and the judicial and leg-
islative branches began almost immediately in the newly-created
government. George Washington first invoked the doctrine that cer-
tain documents were outside the legitimate interests of Congress and
could be withheld by the president.13 6 In 1796, when Congress asked
for information on the negotiations of the controversial Jay Treaty, 37
Washington insisted that such information was inherently and exclu-
sively within the domain of the executive branch.1 3 8 Invoking the
principle of the separation of powers, Washington insisted that "'the
boundaries fixed by the Constitution between the different depart-
ments should be preserved, a just regard to the Constitution and to
the duty of my office ... forbids a compliance with your request.' ,139
Like Washington's, many of the early assertions of executive privilege
are generally acknowledged as excessive interpretations of presiden-
tial power. 4 ' The conflicts between Congress and the first dozen
presidents often dealt with matters considered well-within Congress's
authority to investigate. Although many of these claims were illegiti-
mate, they were driven by core governmental issues.' 4 '
135. See ROZELL, supra note 12, at 35-48 (discussing the use of executive privilege by
numerous presidents with different views regarding the scope of the privilege).
136. See id at 34-36 (noting Washington's use of executive privilege in 1794, when he
allowed Congress to view only some portions of correspondence between U.S. government
officials and the French government, and in 1796, when he refused to disclose information
pertaining to the negotiations of the Jay Treaty).
137. TheJay Treaty was negotiated with Great Britain byJohnJay. Id. at 35. The Treaty
concerned unsettled issues from the American Revolution, and many members of Con-
gress felt that the terms were unfavorable to the United States. Id,
138. Id at 35-36.
139. Id at 35 (quoting 1 JAMES RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PA-
PERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 186-87 (1897)).
140. Cf Louis Fisher, Invoking Executive Privilege: Navigating Ticklish Political Waters, 8 WM.
& MARY BirE RTs.J. 583, 589 (2000) (finding Washington's use of executive privilege unsat-
isfactory because the Jay Treaty had already been ratified, and the House needed the docu-
ments to make an informed decision regarding the appropriation of funds in order to
implement the Treaty). It is interesting that the first such conflict involved a congressional
request that was manifestly proper. Congress was legitimately interested in documents re-
lating to a failed military campaign by General Arthur St. Clair against Native Americans.
See. RoZELL, supra note 12, at 33. While Washington considered refusing the request, he
ultimately relented. IL Likewise, President John Adams balked at a legitimate congres-
sional demand for information on the "XYZ Affair," in which French agents demanded
bribes in exchange for France's cooperation in negotiating an international trade treaty.
See id. at 36. Adams eventually turned over much, but not all, of the requested informa-
tion. Id, ThomasJefferson also improperly resisted efforts by Congress to secure informa-
tion about the Aaron Burr conspiracy on the basis that it was "'the necessary right of the
President of the United States to decide, independently, what papers coming to him as
President, the public interest permit to be communicated, and to whom.'" Id at 37.
141. See ROZELL, supra note 12, at 36 (acknowledging President Adams's use of executive
privilege during the XYZ Affair to protect the safety of American diplomats abroad); id. at
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Although the true scope of executive privilege was not estab-
lished until the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Nixon,'42
modem presidents obviously made the privilege central to their
claims of constitutional authority. President Eisenhower was particu-
larly robust in his use of such claims.143 One factor in the establish-
ment of the Eisenhower doctrine of privilege was his commendable
resistance to the army-McCarthy hearings,144 though his statement of
the doctrine proved far more sweeping:
Because it is essential to efficient and effective administra-
tion that employees of the Executive Branch be in a position
to be completely candid in advising with each other on offi-
cial matters, and because it is not in the public interest that
any of their conversations or communications, or any docu-
ments or reproductions, concerning such advice be dis-
closed, you will instruct employees of your Department that
in all of their appearances before the Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Government Operations regarding
the inquiry now before it they are not to testify to any such
conversations or communications or to produce any such
documents or reproductions. This principle must be main-
tained regardless of who would be benefitted by such
disclosures. 4 5
Yet if the next president follows the historical pattern, he will
downplay the use of executive privilege after this most recent period
41 (noting President Polk's initial refusal to disclose information concerning the negotia-
tions of an 1848 U.S. treaty with Mexico because disclosure could have been prejudicial to
the public interest); id. at 38-39 (noting, among other uses of privilege, President Andrew
Jackson's refusal to give information to Congress regarding U.S. negotiations with Buenos
Aires because such disclosure would have been adverse to the public interest, and his re-
fusal to provide the Senate with information pertaining to the removal of U.S. Surveyor
General Gideon Fitz because the removal was a decision that dealt with exclusively execu-
tive issues).
142. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
143. It is notable that some of the most expansive views of privilege have come from
former generals. See RoZELL, supra note 12, at 32-46 (discussing the use of executive privi-
lege by former generals such as Presidents George Washington, Andrew Jackson, James K.
Polk, and Dwight D. Eisenhower). While certainly not an exclusive list, it does suggest a
certain cultural predilection toward claims of authority to withhold information for the
greater good. In addition to Presidents Washington and Eisenhower, Presidents (and for-
mer Generals) Jackson, Polk, and Grant were particularly resistant to congressional de-
mands. See iL
144. For a discussion of Eisenhower's assertion of privilege in these hearings, see id. at
44-45.
145. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Letter to the Secretary of Defense Directing Him
to Withhold Certain Information from the Senate Committee on Government Operations,
1954 PUB. PAPERS 483, 484 (May 17, 1954).
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of abuse of the privilege. After the Nixon crisis, the next two adminis-
trations showed both a notable disinclination for assertions of privi-
lege and a determination not to test the scope of privilege in court.
1 46
The presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter were called "the
open presidencies," due, in part, to their reluctance to rely on execu-
tive privilege.147 Conversely, the Reagan administration "on several
occasions boldly proclaimed its constitutional prerogative to assert ex-
ecutive privilege"148 and took expansive measures to enhance secrecy
in the executive branch.149 The Reagan White House considered us-
ing the privilege to resist inquiries into controversies ranging from the
failure to carry out environmental laws1"' to the Iran-Contra affair. 5
The Bush administration that followed again tacked back on the use
of executive privilege and maintained that it would be used "only if
absolutely necessary."152
What is striking about this history is how far the Clinton asser-
tions stand outside the historical use of the executive privilege.
1 53
146. See ROZELL, supra note 12, at 83-107 (discussing the somewhat limited use of execu-
tive privilege during the presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter).
147. Id. at 83.
148. Id. at 125. Ultimately, however, due to political and public pressures, the Reagan
administration was limited in its effective use of the privilege. Id.; see also id. at 109 ("The
Reagan administration-accused by many critics of being overly prone to secrecy and de-
ception-showed great reluctance to fully exercise executive privilege."); id. at 111 ("The
Reagan administration adopted a number of measures to enhance secrecy in government.
Nonetheless, the administration, despite such measures, did not vigorously employ or de-
fend executive privilege.").
149. See id. at 111-14 (discussing measures taken by the Reagan White House to main-
tain the secrecy of executive branch activities); cf. id. at 109 ("Ford and Carter mistakenly
assumed after the Watergate scandal that a policy of openness best suited the demands of
presidential leadership. Reagan perhaps better understood that information control, not
openness, enhances presidential power.").
150. See id. at 117-20 (recounting the Reagan administration's initial assertion of execu-
tive privilege and eventual compromise in response to congressional requests to release
documents relating to Superfund cleanup regulations).
151. President Reagan was largely cooperative with Congress's Iran-Contra investigation:
In all, the Reagan administration furnished over three hundred thousand White
House, State Department, Defense Department, CIA, and Justice Department
documents [dealing with Iran-Contra] to Congress. The investigating committees
deposed numerous executive branch officials. The president waived executive
privilege for executive branch officials who testified before Congress.
Id at 121. Reagan, however, considered asserting executive privilege to impede Congress's
access to his personal diaries during the Iran-Contra investigation. Id. at 121-23. Reagan
ultimately decided not to assert the privilege to protect these materials. Id. at 122-23.
152. Id. at 125.
153. The Clinton assertions of privilege often appeared calculated to protect a more
tactical, personal ground than constitutional ground. See Turley, Guarding the King, supra
note 2, at 27 (discussing Clinton's attempt to invoke privilege to prevent members of the
Secret Service from providing information about the President's personal relationship with
Monica Lewinsky); Turley, Nothing Bars Questioning, supra note 2, at Al (discussing Clin-
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The vast majority of past assertions dealt with efforts to acquire infor-
mation relating to core governmental functions and decisions." 4 The
losses of the Clinton administration offer clear and, in my view, cor-
rect guidelines for future assertions. The use of the privilege in crimi-
nal investigations or litigation involving unofficial conduct is
presumably invalid. 155 Future assertions must steer clear of claiming
privilege over "[p]urely private conversations that [do] not touch on
any aspect of the President's official duties or relate in some manner
to presidential decision-making." 156 Of course, the president will con-
tinue to have the benefit of other privileges accorded to all litigants or
targets of criminal investigations. 15 7 When defending actions as a citi-
zen, however, he must do so as a citizen.
The most vital task for the next president is to reestablish clear
lines between the personal and public interests of the president. It
will fall upon this president to instruct his staff to protect the presi-
dency, and not the president, in periods of controversy. This symbolic
message should be reinforced with new guidelines for separating mat-
ters that would properly be handled by private counsel from matters
that should be handled by White House staff. Most importantly, the
next president should select a White House counsel who is committed
to policing these guidelines and who is not viewed as a personal friend
of the First Couple. Ironically, a presidential legacy may be best pro-
tected not by close friends, but by detached counsel.
ton's invocation of privilege after Congress's request for information regarding his deci-
sion to grant clemency to two members of the Armed Forces of National Liberation
(FALN)).
154. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
155. Cf United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (concluding that "when the
ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial
is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the funda-
mental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice"); In re
Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (finding that a White House
attorney may not assert attorney-client privilege "to avoid responding to the grand jury if
he possesses information relating to possible criminal violations"); In re Sealed Case, 148
F.3d 1073, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (declining to recognize a protective func-
tion privilege that would have entitled Secret Service agents to withhold information about
President Clinton's personal relationship with Monica Lewinsky).
156. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26 (D.D.C.), affd in pad, rev'd in
part sub norn. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
157. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution
presumably apply to the president as well. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709-11 (implying that a
president, as a defendant, is still entitled to the same basic constitutional rights as all other
citizens, such as the guarantees against compelled self-incrimination, the right to due pro-
cess, and the right to privileged conversations made to priests and attorneys when revealed
in professional confidence).
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The assertions of privilege during the Clinton scandals, however,
should not be the sole source of concern for the new administra-
tion.1 58 The Clinton administration made several controversial asser-
tions of executive privilege in areas unrelated to the various
scandals.1 59 Most notable was the invocation of privilege in 1999 to
bar inquiries into the presidential clemency given to Puerto Rican ter-
rorists." President Clinton used his pardon powers to release over a
dozen terrorists who were members of the Armed Forces of National
Liberation (FALN) and the FALN subset group known as Los
Macheteros, or "the Machete Wielders." 6 ' FALN was responsible for
130 bombings that killed six people and maimed others in a campaign
of terror during in the 1970s and 1980s.' 6 2 Clemency for terrorism
was itself controversial at a time when world governments struggled
158. Another concern was highlighted in the final days of the Clinton administration.
While not the focus of this Article, President Clinton's use of recess appointments is an-
other matter that raises serious constitutional concerns that should be addressed directly
by the next president. With only weeks left in his term, President Clinton gave a recess
appointment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to Roger Greg-
ory. Lyle Denniston, Politics, Race Cloud Naming of Judges to U.S. 4th Circuit; Clinton Ducks
Senate to Appoint First Black, BALT. SUN, Jan. 8, 2001, at 1A. Such recess appointments to the
bench were once common, and hundreds of such appointments have been made in the
past. See Dan Eggen, Clinton Names Black Judge to Appeals Court; Recess Choice for Richmond
Circuit is Challenge to GOP, WASH. PosT, Dec. 28, 2000, at Al ("The tactic hasn't been em-
ployed since 1980, but more than 300 recess appointments have been made to the federal
judiciary in the two centuries before that."). However, such appointments violate the sys-
tem of checks and balances, which requires Senate confirmation and guarantees life ten-
ure for Article IIIjudges. In the case of Gregory, he will now rule for a year as ajudge in
the very status that Article III attempts to avoid: a judge who has a direct interest in the
popularity of his decisions. See Brooke A. Masters & Spencer S. Hsu, Allen, Warner Support
Clinton's 4th Circuit Appointee, WAsH. PosT, Jan. 26, 2001, at B5 (noting Judge Gregory's
precarious status as a recess appointee). Gregory will rule on cases while his nomination
remains before the Senate. Id. Every vote that he makes will influence any later confirma-
tion vote, depriving litigants of the neutrality of a fully vested Article III judge. Recess
judicial appointments should be condemned by the next president, as well as by senators
from both parties as inimical to our constitutional and political processes.
159. See, e.g., Turley, Nothing Bars Questioning, supra note 2, at B7 (discussing Clinton's
assertion of privilege to bar disclosure of documents pertaining to his decision to grant
clemency to FALN members).
160. I was highly critical of this decision and the subsequent claims of executive privi-
lege. See id. (criticizing President Clinton's assertion of privilege in the FALN matter as
"too broad and based on a flawed concept of our separation of powers" and stating that
President Clinton's use of privilege during his terms in office was "extreme and
unfounded").
161. Sean Scully, FBI Disputes Clinton's Portrayal of FALN Members; Terrorism Expert Calls
Clemency Group a Threat to Nation, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1999, at Al.
162. Charles Babington & David A. Vise, Clinton Explains Clemency; Politics Had No Role in
Decision, President Tells House Member, WASH. PosT, Sept. 22, 1999, at A2.
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with the threat of terrorist attacks. 1 6 3 Moreover, the Justice Depart-
ment, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and various other federal
officials opposed the clemencies as unjustified and even threatening
to the nation.1"4 These concerns took on a particularly harsh light
when it was alleged that President Clinton was motivated not by
mercy, but rather by First Lady Hillary Clinton's campaign for the
Senate in New York, where a large Hispanic population was heavily in
favor of the FALN clemencies.1 6 5 Before the FALN decision, Presi-
dent Clinton had only granted three commutations in his two
terms,1 6 6 and his selection of sixteen terrorists from hundreds of peti-
tions seemed highly suspicious to Congress. 16 7 Congress demanded
information on the process involved in the FALN decision." 6 Presi-
163. Ironically, one argument in favor of pardoning such domestic revolutionaries can
be traced to Alexander Hamilton, who noted that:
the principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case in the
Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often
critical moments when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels
may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass
unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall.
THE FEDERAUST No. 74, at 449 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
164. See Babington & Vise, supra note 162, at A2 (quoting the FBI's Assistant Director for
National Security as stating that "'[t]hey are criminals, and they are terrorists, and they
represent a threat to the United States'"); David Johnston, Federal Agencies Opposed Leniency
for 16 Militants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1999, at Al (noting the unanimous opposition of
federal law enforcement agencies to leniency for the FALN members); cf. Babington &
Vise, supra note 162, at A2 (quoting FBI Director Louis J. Freeh as stating that "[t]he FBI
has consistently advised the Department ofJustice... in writing, that the FBI was opposed
to any such pardon and/or commutation of sentences for any of these individuals" (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
165. See Babington & Vise, supra note 162, at A2.
166. See Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections on the
President's Duty To Be Merciful, 27 FoRDrHA" URB. L.J. 1483, 1493 n.38 (2000).
167. See Babington & Vise, supra note 162, at A2 (noting Republicans' immediate suspi-
cions as to Clinton's motives in the FALN pardons). The past clemency decisions by the
President seemed strikingly different in terms of the underlying criminal conduct and the
support from officials in his administration:
Prior to the FALN commutations in 1999, President Clinton had granted only
three commutations: one in 1994 to Ernest Krikava, a Nebraska hog farmer sen-
tenced in 1993 to five months' imprisonment for perjury in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, whose clemency petition had attracted intense media interest and
support of family farm groups; and two in 1995 to individuals convicted of drug
trafficking offenses who had cooperated with the government. One of these was
made to Johnny Palacios, sentenced in 1991 to 71 months' imprisonment for dis-
tribution of marijuana, whose cooperation the court refused to recognize for ju-
risdictional reasons; and the other was made to Jackie Trautman, sentenced in
1992 to 33 months' imprisonment (as reduced) for distribution of cocaine, whose
cooperation had already earned her two sentence reductions from the court on
motion of the U.S. Attorney.
Love, supra note 166, at 1493 n.38.
168. Turley, Nothing Bars Questioning, supra note 2, at B7.
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dent Clinton invoked executive privilege and refused to disclose the
information. 6 9
The Constitution makes it expressly clear that the "Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except
in Cases of Impeachment" rests exclusively with the president.17 0 It is
equally clear that Congress cannot interfere with the decision of the
president in granting this relief.' 7 1 With the FALN case, however,
Congress was not trying to stop or reverse the clemency decisions of
the terrorist members. Rather, it was demanding information to de-
termine whether such decisions were made for improper or unlawful
purposes. 172 In response, the Clinton administration and various law
professors argued that, since clemency is not subject to congressional
approval, it is an absolute executive power that cannot be subject to
congressional inquiry.173 This argument was both extreme and unten-
able. Professor Peter Shane, for example, insisted that "[i] n short, for
169. Id.
170. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
171. SeeExparteGarland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) ("Congress can neither limit the effect
of [the president's] pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders.").
172. See Hearings Concerning Clemency for FALN Members Before the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 106th Cong., Oct. 20, 1999, Federal News Service, Inc. [hereinafter Senate FALN Hear-
ings] (prepared testimony of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (discussing possible justifications for
Clinton's clemency decision and suggesting that the decision was improper because "there
was [no] medical reason for any of the clemency offers," and that "the sentences received
by [the] defendants [were] consistent with the sentences they would have received under
the Sentencing Guidelines... [and] nothing produced... gives any suggestion that any of
the 16 offered clemency ever cooperated with law enforcement regarding open cases or
the apprehension of fugitives").
173. See, e.g., id. (statement of Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney General) (testifying that
President Clinton's assertion of executive privilege prevents him from disclosing informa-
tion pertaining to advice given to the President about clemency to the FALN members and
that an assertion of executive privilege is valid, as in this case, when the matter concerns
presidential pardons); Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privilege, Confidentiality, Trust; The Road
to a Compromise Between the White House and Congress, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1999, at A31.
Professor Katyal defended the use of privilege in the FALN matter:
The Constitution gives the president an absolute right to grant pardons that
neither Congress nor anyone else can ever undo. And the practice of the Justice
Department for more than 100 years has been not to provide information about
clemency to Congress-at least when that material concerns internal delibera-
tions. Given all this, Congress should think twice before trying to uncover the
reasons motivating a particular pardon.
Katyal, supra, at A31. Congress was not, of course, suggesting that it could undo the FALN
decisions, but rather was asserting that it could inquire as to areas of alleged abuse of this
power. See Turley, Nothing Bars Questioning, supra note 2, at B7. It is difficult to imagine
when such a congressional inquiry is appropriate if not in the case of a clemency of un-
repentant terrorists in a matter with alleged benefits to a member of the president's family.
Nevertheless, Professor Katyal presents a more moderate approach in suggesting that, after
asserting privilege, the White House should have yielded (with certain guarantees) to some
of these inquiries. See Katyal, supra, at A31 (stating that "[n]evertheless, there are circum-
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better or worse, Congress has no institutional responsibilities with re-
gard to pardons."174 Professor Shane, however, went on to add that
"[t]he only exception would arise if it appeared that criminality had
tainted the pardon process-for example, if the U.S. pardon attorney
were accepting bribes to recommend presidential leniency."175 Thus,
it would appear that Congress does have some "institutional respon-
sibilit[y] with regard to pardons." To carry out this responsibility,
though, Congress must exercise its authority to investigate allegations
of such misconduct, which should not be limited to criminal acts in a
case of impeachment.
176
No power in the Constitution is truly absolute; other governmen-
tal branches reserve various methods to respond to abusive decisions.
When a power is given exclusively to one branch, that power can be
abused. It is then that the other branches play a vital role in address-
ing the alleged abuse. 177 Thus, while Congress cannot interfere with
the issuance of a clemency, it has the power of oversight, the power of
the purse, and even the impeachment power to respond to abuses of
presidential authority.178 In fact, in 1787, the abuse of the pardon
power was a matter of concern during the drafting and ratification of
stances in which political necessity might demand an explanation" and concluding that
both branches of government should make concessions in the case).
174. Peter M. Shane, Clinton's Right; He Shouldn't Turn Over the Clemency Records, WAsH.
PosT, Sept. 26, 1999, at BI.
175. Id
176. I only disagree with Professor Shane's point in isolating criminal conduct. An im-
peachment can occur for noncriminal conduct. SeeJonathan Turley, The Executive Function
Theory, the Hamilton Affair, and Other Constitutional Mythologies, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1791, 1844
(1999) (stating that "Congress always has followed a broad definition of impeachment that
includes non-criminal conduct and not simply abuse of... authority"); id. (explaining that
"[t] he appropriate question is not whether officials can be removed for non-criminal con-
duct, but rather what is the scope of non-criminal conduct for which they can be re-
moved"); id. (citing previous noncriminal yet impeachable offenses, such as abusive use of
authority, alcoholism, and abusive personal conduct).
177. Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch rather than the judicial branch that is most
likely to respond to such controversies. Cf Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S.
458, 464 (1981) ("[P]ardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the
business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial re-
view."). Courts are most likely to become involved in disputes over the validity of executive
privilege assertions in response to congressional inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
178. Ironically, while it was the potential political benefit to the First Lady that sparked
the FALN controversy, the final day of the Clinton administration established the need for
full oversight of pardon decisions as they relate to familial conflicts. President Clinton
waited until the final hours of his term to pardon his own brother, Roger, of his prior drug
convictions. Clinton Brother, Hearst Make List, CHI. T~aB., Jan. 21, 2001, at 16. Such a par-
don was clearly within his authority, but it was also an outrageous and unethical use of
official power for personal advantage. Had such a pardon been issued earlier, Congress
would have been negligent not to call for hearings as part of its oversight function.
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the Constitution.179 In a speech that could have been taken from the
current debate, one delegate noted:
[S] hould the President pardon.., or afterwards forgive no-
torious villains, or persons who should be unfit objects of
mercy, this would be such a misfeasance of his office, as
would subject himself to be personally impeached. He is as
responsible for transactions in one part of his office as
another. 180
If judged by the Clinton administration's consistent and recent
behavior, a president can refuse information to Congress even in mat-
ters which, if proven, would be a potential basis for impeachment.
Thus, assuming arguendo that the president sold a clemency, Con-
gress would have legitimate grounds to seek impeachment.181 In a
system built on checks and balances, no reasonable court would refuse
to compel disclosure of information on the suggestion of an abuse of
an "absolute" power of the president. 18 2 The concerns behind Con-
gress's requests in the FALN matter were neither trivial nor misplaced.
After showing no inclination to use this power in all but a few uncon-
troversial cases,18 the President, over the objections of officials in his
own administration, s4 granted clemency to a group of terrorists in a
manner that would be of potential benefit to his spouse. 85 Moreover,
179. See, e.g., An Impartial Citizen V, PETERSBURG VIRGINIA GAZETTE, Feb. 28, 1788, in 8
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: VIRGINIA 428 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino
eds., 1988) (discussing various Framers' views on the advantages and pitfalls of the pardon-
ing power); cf George Mason, Objections to the Proposed Federal Constitution (1787), in I DOCU-
MENTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL & LEGAL HISTORY 115, 117 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed.,
1989) ("The President of the United States has the unrestrained Power of granting Pardon
for Treason; which may be sometimes exercised to screen from Punishment those whom
he had secretly instigated to commit the Crime, and thereby prevent a Discovery of his own
Guilt.").
180. An Impartial Citizen V, supra note 179, at 429-30 (emphasis omitted).
181. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President... shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.").
182. Cf Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706 (stating that "neither the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications.., can sustain an abso-
lute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity").
183. See supra note 167 (describing Clinton's other uses of the power to grant
clemency).
184. See supra note 164 (noting the opposition in the executive branch to Clinton's deci-
sion to grant clemency in the FALN matter).
185. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (citing the potential political benefit to
Hillary Clinton of granting clemency to FALN members); see also Susan Baer, BALT. SUN,
Jan. 21, 2001, at 23A (noting that on his final day in office, Clinton granted clemency to
"many who are personally close to Clinton .... [including] Susan McDougal, a former
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the clemency decisions contradicted federal guidelines and were sup-
ported by challenged statements of fact.
18 6
The assertion of executive privilege in the FALN clemency matter
was not inherently wrong, but rather was stated too expansively. The
President could have legitimately protected communications with his
advisers on this issue. Yet some of the inquiries of Congress fell
squarely within its oversight functions. 1 7 Where communications
were not disclosed directly, summaries could have been supplied to
meet congressional needs.' Putting aside the question of the limits
of privilege in such inquiries, values of good government should have
prompted greater cooperation with Congress to resolve public ques-
tions about the FALN decision."8 9 This is precisely the type of conflict
Whitewater business partner who went to prison and steadfastly refused to cooperate, as
well as his half-brother, Roger Clinton").
186. See Senate FALN Hearings, supra note 172 (prepared testimony of Sen. Orrin G.
Hatch). Senator Hatch stated that:
Our investigation has led us to three troubling conclusions: - First, the President's
proffered reasons in support of the clemency do not survive scrutiny; - Second,
the Justice Department appears to have ignored its own rules for handling clem-
ency matters and modified its original recommendation against clemency; and -
Third, the Justice Department itself has concluded that the release of these indi-
viduals may well increase the risk of domestic terrorism.
Id
187. See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text (discussing the legitimacy of such
congressional oversight inquiries).
188. Cf ROZELL, supra note 12, at 33-48 (setting forth examples of presidential decisions
to partially comply with congressional requests for information); infra note 190 (discussing
the compromises of the Ford, Carter, and Bush administrations).
189. One of the more problematic aspects of the Clinton administration was its increas-
ingly evasive approach to Congress. In various areas, the administration took controversial
steps to avoid congressional involvement on issues of national importance. This included
an attempt to use the courts rather than Congress to increase regulation of the tobacco
industry. See Jonathan Turley, A Crisis in Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian Democracy, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 454 (2000) (noting the Clinton administration's decision "to pur-
sue ajudicial remedy in the tobacco crisis"). It also included the use of executive orders to
set aside huge tracts of federal land from commercial uses or roadbuilding at the very end
of the second term. See Lee Davidson, Parting Shot: 7 New Monuments, DESERET NEWS, Jan.
20, 2001, at A10 (reporting that, including areas protected in his final days in office, "Clin-
ton has now proclaimed 16 national monuments and expanded three others, covering a
total of 5.6 million acres"). Likewise, President Clinton used recess appointments when
Congress expressed opposition to nominees like acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights Bill Lann Lee. See Clinton Keeps Lee as Civil Rights Chief CHI. TRIB., Aug. 4, 2000, at
A20. One of the most alarming acts, however, came in the final days of the Clinton admin-
istration when a recess appointment was given to Roger Gregory to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See supra note 158. Such measures tear at the fabric of
the tripartite system and the system of checks and balances. Certainly, some of these or-
ders are defensible uses of executive authority in areas such as federal lands. However,
taken as a whole, they represent a disturbing pattern. At a minimum, the next president
should consider policy changes to better align executive actions with the basic principles of
the Madisonian democracy. This should include a statement denouncing the use of recess
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upon which presidents like Ford, Carter, and Bush had previously
compromised.1 90 There is nothing more corrosive for the political sys-
tem than lingering questions of misuse of power. To avoid further
erosion and controversy, the tendency of the Clinton administration
to state privilege in absolute terms must be replaced by the incoming
president with a more moderate and balanced approach.
II. CONCLUSION
A review of the current status of executive privilege reveals, as
Milton once described in Paradise Lost, "[n]o light, but rather dark-
ness visible."19' After the rulings against the Clinton administration,
executive privilege has been defined largely in terms of the "darkness
visible"-the areas now largely barred to the use of executive privilege
or governmental attorney-client privilege. Instead of vainly hoping for
any light revealed by the Clinton crisis, the next administration would
be best to avoid the darkness by adopting bright-line rules and new
policies in these core areas of conflict.
To a certain extent, the continued viability of executive privilege
will depend on whether the next administration exercises a degree of
restraint in using this tempting avenue to resist congressional or judi-
cial inquiries. The Ford, Carter, and Bush administrations demon-
strated that such restraint is possible and not inimical to the
functioning of the executive branch. The next president, however,
will be called upon to take proactive steps and not simply remain pas-
appointments to the judiciary, a practice that is poorly suited to a democratic system and
ultimately undermines both the nominee and the court for which he is nominated.
190. See ROZELL, supra note 12, at 90-91 (pointing out President Ford's willingness to
eventually comply with congressional requests regarding the decision-making process in-
volved in pardoning President Nixon and his partial compliance in divulging CIA docu-
ments concerning that agency's complicity in assassination schemes, but only to the extent
that such documents were relevant to Congress's specific inquiries); supra notes 146-147,
152 and accompanying text (discussing the "open presidencies" of Ford and Carter, and
President Bush's narrow view of executive privilege).
President Carter shied away from issuing a formal policy that specified his administra-
tion's position on executive privilege. See RoZELL, supra note 12, at 97. This prompted his
administration to rarely invoke the privilege. See id. at 101-07 (discussing Carter's limited
use of the privilege).
During the Bush administration, controversy arose between Congress and President
Bush over Bush's Persian Gulf policy. Id. at 130. Congress sought numerous and specific
military documents pertaining to various issues such as Iraqi military capabilities, the possi-
ble consequences of conflict on international oil supplies, and U.S. vulnerability to terror-
ist attacks. Id. The Bush administration eventually complied with the request, but only
provided a summary of the information in order to protect national security to the maxi-
mum extent possible. Id. at 131-32.
191. MILTON & ASIMOV, supra note 1, at 10.
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sive in the area of executive privilege. The substantive and symbolic
losses that occurred during the Clinton administration should be ad-
dressed at the very start of the new administration. The next presi-
dent has the ability to establish a new bright line for future
presidential conduct. To a certain extent, this will require surrender-
ing certain prerogatives like the unilateral appointment of White
House counsel or the continued assertion of a protective function
privilege. 19 2 It is never easy to take such steps, particularly after a se-
ries of losses of privilege under the prior chief executive. Yet estab-
lishing a good government initiative as a central part of the transition
process, the next president can forge a legacy that is not dependent
on a divided Congress. Rather, he can begin the process of reform by
first bringing his own office into order. Rather than yielding to con-
tinued recriminations concerning the prior administration, such re-
form can be based on a frank reappraisal of the conditions that
produced the conflicts and controversies of the last eight years. Of
course, nothing is more difficult for a new officeholder than to forego
privileges or prerogatives of office. Certainly, in a town where per-
sonal loyalty is a rare and needed commodity, it is hard for a president
to take measures to guarantee that members of his staff always place
the interests of the presidency before those of the president. How-
ever, nothing would speak more forcibly or eloquently to his leader-
ship and to the future of the presidency.
192. The new administration has the opportunity to make significant changes to estab-
lish core values of good government that extend beyond the general proposals discussed
above. One such change would be the immediate reversal of a decision made by President
Clinton in the waning days of his final term. Over the objection of various public interest
groups, President Clinton rescinded Executive Order 412834 that he signed on his first day
in office in 1993. See Frank James, Clinton Not Going Quietly, CHI. TuaB.,Jan. 6, 2001, at Al.
This order barred senior officials in the executive branch from lobbying for five years. Id,
The decision to rescind the order at the end of his second term appeared cynical and
opportunistic. See Revolving Door Is Back, THE HiLL, Jan. 10, 2001, at 20 (reporting that
"Clinton apparently acted after a number of his current and recently departed appointees
complained that they faced a tough job market in a town ruled by a Republican president
and GOP control of Congress"). What is clear is that this decision served the interests of a
relatively small number of senior officials over the interests of government ethics and the
public. The ban on lobbying should be both reinstated and reinforced by the next presi-
dent. Such a commitment must have a permanency that extends beyond any temporary
political benefit. Like other suggestions in this Article, such a ban constitutes something of
a sacrifice for the new administration. However, few policies are more demonstrative of a
commitment to high-level appointees who do the public's business exclusively and
faithfully.
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